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Comment
The Americans with Disabilities Act: Will
the Court Get the Hint? Congress' Attempt
to Raise the Status of Persons with
Disabilities in Equal Protection Cases
If you fail to see the person but only the disability, then, who is
blind?
If you cannot hear your brother's cry for justice, who is deaf?
If you do not communicate with your sister but separate her from
you, who is disabled?
If your heart and your mind do not reach out to your neighbour,
who has the mental handicap?
If you do not stand up for rights of all persons, who is the cripple?
Your attitude towards persons with disabilities may be our biggest
handicap,
And yours too.'
I. Introduction
At present, there are an estimated forty-three million
Americans with disabilities 2 in the United States.3 Although
persons with disabilities 4 have been the subject of legislation
since the early 1900s, 5 Congress has often overlooked their
1. Tony Wong, Who is Disabled?, in THE QUIET EAR 235 (Brian Grant ed.,
1988).
2. See infra text accompanying note 170 for the definition of a disabled indi-
vidual under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
4. It is this author's belief, based on her experience working with "persons
with disabilities," that this is the preferred terminology, as opposed to "handi-
capped," when referring to individuals with disabilities as a group.
5. See infra part II.B for a discussion of the history of legislation affecting
persons with disabilities.
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rights. Statutes aimed at enhancing the status of persons with
disabilities have, for the most part, failed to provide comprehen-
sive protection against widespread discrimination. The nation's
courts have also failed to provide clear, strong, or consistent
standards for combatting pervasive discrimination against indi-
viduals with disabilities. As recently as 1985, the United States
Supreme Court in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center'
refused to accord governmental classifications based on disabil-
ity the "quasi-suspect" status7 applied to classifications based
on gender or illegitimacy.8 Instead, the Court relegated classifi-
cations based on disability to the lowest level of scrutiny, sub-
ject only to the "rational basis test."9
Then, in 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act (ADA),1° guaranteeing equal opportunity for individ-
uals with disabilities in public accommodations, employment,
transportation, state and local government services, and tele-
communications." The ADA affords civil rights protections to
persons with disabilities, similar to those provided by the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, to individuals on the basis of race, sex, na-
tional origin, and religion.12 The ADA has revolutionized the
extent of rights afforded the disabled based on their special sta-
tus. Thus, it is understandable why commentators have labeled
the ADA "the Emancipation Proclamation" of people with
disabilities. 13
6. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
7. See infra part II.A.4 for a discussion of quasi-suspect class status.
8. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding gender to be a "quasi-sus-
pect" class); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (holding illegitimacy to be a
"quasi-suspect" class).
9. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446; see infra part II.A.2 for a discussion of the ra-
tional basis test.
10. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-
12,213 (Supp. V 1993)).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (Supp. V 1993).
12. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 101-106 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000a to a-6, 2000e to e-17 (1988)) (prohibiting discrimination in public accom-
modations and employment on the basis of race, color, creed, national origin, or
sex).
13. See, e.g., Glen Elsasser, Senate OK's Rights Bill for Disabled, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 9, 1989, § 1, at 1. ("The ADA 'is a 20th Century Emancipation Proclamation
for people with disabilities,' said Sen. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), the bill's chief spon-
sor."); Tom Harkin, Our Newest Civil Rights Law, 26 TRIAL 56 (Dec. 1990); Ed-
mund V. Ludwig and Suzanne E. Turner, New Promises to Keep, 13 PA. LAw. 15
(Jan. 1991).
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Individuals with disabilities have been lobbying the na-
tion's courts for decades to raise their status as a class for pur-
poses of equal protection review, albeit unsuccessfully. 14 By
enacting the ADA, Congress has set forth a "sharp mandate"
against disability discrimination 5 that several courts have used
as a guide to interpreting federal and state legislation, finding
that the disabled are entitled to special protection from the
courts.16
This Comment will examine whether Congress, in enacting
the ADA, was attempting to mandate a heightened level of judi-
cial scrutiny in cases dealing with a classification based on disa-
bility, and whether it has the authority to do so. It will also
examine the issue of how the courts should view future alleged
acts of discrimination against persons with disabilities, espe-
cially when the alleged discrimination does not fall under the
prohibitions of the ADA. Since the ADA's passage in 1990, the
Supreme Court has not addressed the question of whether the
disabled now constitute a suspect class.17
Part II of this Comment will provide the reader with an
overview of the rights afforded the disabled before the enact-
ment of the ADA and will review the relevant Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence surrounding this issue. Part III will
present the statutory framework of the ADA and will explore
leading federal and state court decisions involving the question
of whether the disabled now constitute a suspect class for pur-
poses of constitutional and statutory interpretation. Part IV
will analyze whether Congress can create a suspect class by
14. See, e.g., California Ass'n of the Physically Handicapped v. FCC, 721 F.2d
667, 670 (9th Cir. 1983) (refusing to hold that disabled individuals are a suspect
class); Brown v. Sibley, 650 F.2d 760, 766 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that disabled
individuals are not a suspect class); Upshur v. Love, 474 F. Supp. 332, 337 (N.D.
Cal. 1979) (commenting that physical handicap is more analogous to age than race
and, therefore, evokes only the rational basis standard).
15. Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Overview, 22
N.M. L. REv. 13, 18 (1992).
16. See infra part III.B.1 for a discussion of case law using the ADA as a guide
to interpreting various statutes.
17. The Court denied certiorari in January 1994 to the only case properly re-
questing review of this issue-Ibarra v. Duc Van Le, 114 S. Ct. 918 (1994). See
infra part III.B.2.c for a discussion of the Duc Van Le case. See also Heller v. Doe,
113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642 (1993) (refusing to address the issue of whether the mentally
retarded, a sub-group of the disabled, constitute a quasi-suspect class, solely be-
cause the issue was not presented to any of the lower courts).
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statute, thereby mandating that courts use the strict scrutiny
standard of review. In Part IV's analysis, the implications of
the Supreme Court's inevitable decision of this issue will be dis-
cussed. The analysis will conclude that the Court will most
likely deem individuals with disabilities a quasi-suspect class,
rather than afford individuals with disabilities full-fledged sus-
pect class status. This Comment proposes that quasi-suspect
class status would be most beneficial to individuals with disabil-
ities. Finally, Part V will conclude that although Congress, us-
ing its enumerated powers, gave every indication of its desire to
promote persons with disabilities to the status of "suspect
class," it did not explicitly mandate a higher level of review on
the nation's courts. As a result, the ultimate decision of
whether the disabled will be raised to the judicially protected
status of suspect or quasi-suspect class will be left to the discre-
tion of the courts.
II. Background
A. What is a "Suspect Class"?
1. Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion provides that "[nlo State shall make or enforce any law
which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."18 The Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of equal protection applies to state governments. 19
In addition, the Supreme Court in Bolling v. Sharpe20 held that
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 [hereinafter the Equal Protection Clause].
The full text of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the ju-
risdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
Id.
19. Id. ("[nlo State shall... deny.... ."). Local governments are considered to
be subdivisions of the state. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states
and all of its "creatures").
20. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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the federal government is bound by the same equal protection
standard as the states. 21
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
essentially directs the federal and state governments to treat all
similarly situated persons alike.22 From the beginning, courts
have interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to "impose a gen-
eral restraint on the use of classifications" in legislation or
through government action, "whatever the area regulated,
whatever the classification criterion used."23 Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce
the equal protection mandate,24 but absent controlling congres-
sional direction, the courts have devised their own standards for
determining whether challenged state legislation or other offi-
cial action violates the Equal Protection Clause.25 Therefore,
21. Id. at 500. In Boling, the Court ruled that the federal government, specif-
ically the District of Columbia, could not operate racially segregated schools any
more than the states could. Id. On the same day as the Bolling decision, the Court
also decided the seminal case of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(holding that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the states from maintaining
racially segregated public schools). The Bolling Court stated that "[i]n view of our
decision that the Constitution prohibits the States from maintaining racially seg-
regated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would
impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government." Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500.
Therefore, the Court held that when the federal government makes a classification
which, if it were a state, would violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec-
tion Clause, the courts will treat this classification as a violation of the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, which is directly applicable to the federal gov-
ernment. Id. The Court reasoned that "the concepts of equal protection and due
process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually ex-
clusive." Id. at 499. Thus, although the Fifth Amendment does not expressly con-
tain an equal protection clause, the Boling Court, in essence, read an equal
protection mandate into the spirit of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause,
imposing the same equal protection standards on the federal government as exist
on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally id. at 499-500.
Accord Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) ("Equal protection analysis in the
Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.");
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964) ("[While the Fifth Amendment con-
tains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifi-
able as to be violative of due process.'") (citing Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499).
22. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
23. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW 676 (10th ed. 1980).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. The full text of Section Five reads: "The
Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article." Id. Section Five is also referred to as the Enabling Clause.
25. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439-40
(1985) (referring to the three-tier approach of equal protection review devised over
the years by the Supreme Court).
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when Congress is silent, i.e., it has not used its authority under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to pass appropriate
legislation, then the courts do not engage in statutory interpre-
tation when faced with an equal protection claim.26 Rather, the
courts interpret the Constitution itself by referring to the equal
protection jurisprudence that has evolved throughout the
Court's decisions involving the Equal Protection Clause. 27 How-
ever, when Congress enacts equal protection legislation pursu-
ant to its Section Five power, the courts engage in mere
statutory interpretation. 2  In other words, the courts use that
statute to determine if the governmental action that is the sub-
ject of the case comports with the requirements of that statute
or is in conflict with it. 29 If the governmental action at issue
conflicts with an act of Congress or the Constitution, then that
action must fall to the congressional legislation under the
Supremacy Clause.30
26. See id. (noting that when Congress is silent and there is no statute on
point to review, the courts themselves determine the validity of action that is chal-
lenged under the Equal Protection Clause).
27. See id. at 440 (referring to the Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence de-
veloped to interpret the Equal Protection Clause); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 6-25, at 479 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that courts
assess the validity of state action in independent constitutional terms only when
Congress is silent and has not legislated).
28. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (engaging in statu-
tory interpretation of section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 enacted pursu-
ant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment).
29. Id.; see also NoRMAN J. SIGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 45.01, at 1 (4th ed. 1984) (stating that the particular language of a statute is
always the starting point on any question concerning the application of the law).
30. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 [hereinafter the Supremacy Clause]. The full text
of the Supremacy Clause reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id. See also Morgan, 384 U.S. at 646-47 (holding that by force of the Supremacy
Clause, New York's English literacy requirement cannot be enforced to the extent
that it is inconsistent with the Voting Rights Act of 1965-a congressional act);
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824) ("[T]o such acts of the State
Legislatures as do not transcend their powers, but... interfere with, or are con-
trary to the law of Congress,.. . the act of Congress ... is supreme; and the law of
the State... must yield to it.").
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Generally, the Supreme Court determines which groups re-
ceive special protection under the Equal Protection Clause, 31
while Congress customarily limits itself to creating enabling
legislation based on the groups that the Court has singled out
for special protection.3 2 However, this is not a firm rule. There
have been situations where Congress has used its Section Five
power to enact legislation concerning a class not yet afforded
special protection by the Court.33 For example, under its Sec-
tion Five authority, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA),34 the 1972 amendments to Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 35 and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA)36 to aid groups not yet given special
31. The Supreme Court has thus far set forth a limited and exclusive list of
classifications for equal protection purposes: race, gender, illegitimacy, and alien-
age. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (gender);
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (illegitimacy); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (national origin). These classifications are
given special protection in the courts of the United States. Courts engage in
heightened forms of scrutiny when any governmental action or piece of legislation
singles out a group of persons based on one of the above classifications or catego-
ries. See generally Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41 (describing the protected classifi-
cations and the type of scrutiny afforded each one by the courts). For a thoughtful
discussion of equal protection analysis, see J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Supreme
Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality,
61 VA. L. REV. 945 (1975).
32. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 101-106 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000a to a-6, 2000e to e-17 (1988)) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
race and gender, two classifications previously singled out for special protection by
the Court); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1988) (prohibiting inter-
ference with the right to vote based on race, an established suspect class); Equal
Pay Act of 1963 § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988) (prohibiting employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of gender, a protected class).
33. See Matt Pawa, When The Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights,
Can Congress Save Us? An Examination Of Section 5 Of The Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1029 (1993), for an in-depth discussion of Congress' power
under Section Five and specific examples of Congress legislating in areas not yet
recognized as protected classes. See also infra notes 309-25 and accompanying
text.
34. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
35. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)
(1988)).
36. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-
1 to -4 (Supp. V 1993)).
7
PACE LAW REVIEW
protection by the judiciary.37 Furthermore, the Court has given
Congress' actions under Section Five complete deference by
raising the status of gender to that of a quasi-suspect class in
the wake of Congress' enactment of the amendments to Title
VII. 38 Thus, the Court has allowed Congress, through its legis-
lation, to essentially add to the constitutional guarantees af-
forded under the Fourteenth Amendment.39
Katzenbach v. Morgan40 is generally recognized as the case
in which the Court gave its greatest deference to Congress' ex-
pansive power under Section Five, by allowing Congress to basi-
cally define constitutional rights not yet identified by the
courts.41 At issue in Morgan was section 4(e) of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.42 Section 4(e) provided that no person who
successfully completed up to the sixth grade in a public or pri-
vate school located in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, should
be denied the right to vote because of his or her inability to read
or write English.43 Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act essen-
tially nullified New York's English literacy voting requirement,
as applied to persons who completed up to the sixth grade in a
Puerto Rican school.44 The State of New York argued that an
exercise of congressional power under Section Five that pre-
vents the application of a state law could only be valid if the
judiciary determined that the state action prohibited by the con-
37. See infra notes 309-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
statutes and how they relate to Congress' authority under Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
38. See infra notes 309-18 and accompanying text; see also Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976) (raising the status of gender to that of a quasi-suspect class after
Congress passed the 1972 amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
39. See Pawa, supra note 33, for examples of Congress legislating in areas not
yet given special protection by the Supreme Court and the Court's subsequent ap-
proval of Congress' actions; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (raising
the status of gender to a quasi-suspect class after Congress legislated under its
Section Five power to amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which out-
lawed gender discrimination); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (upholding
Congress' use of its Section Five power to enact amendments to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964).
40. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
41. See Pawa, supra note 33, at 1060; see also Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Mea-
sure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1212, 1229 (1978).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1988).
43. Id.
44. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 643-44.
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gressional legislation is forbidden by the Equal Protection
Clause itself.45 The Court disagreed. The Court held that Con-
gress had the authority to enact this legislation under Section
Five,46 even though the Court had not previously provided that
the Puerto Rican community should be given special protection
under the Equal Protection Clause47 The Court stated that
Section Five "is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing
Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and
what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Four-
teenth Amendment."48 The Court declared that Congress had
the right, under Section Five, to enact laws that increase equal
protection guarantees, although Congress may not "restrict, ab-
rogate, or dilute these guarantees."49
Commentators have referred to the Court's declaration in
Morgan of Congress' expansive power under Section Five as the
"Ratchet Theory," so called because it allows Congress to effect
equal protection rights, but only one way.50 Congress may in-
crease equal protection rights, but not decrease or dilute
them.51 While the Ratchet Theory appears to remain good con-
stitutional law,52 the Supreme Court has never used it to ex-
pressly authorize Congress to create by statute a quasi-suspect
or suspect class. Meanwhile, Congress has not explicitly used
its power in this fashion either. This authority would appear to
be inherent in the Ratchet Theory; however, Congress has thus
far never required the Court to treat a class of people as a sus-
pect or quasi-suspect class, thereby forcing the Court to use
strict or heightened scrutiny. Instead, the Ratchet Theory ap-
pears to be limited to Congress enacting legislation to aid
45. Id. at 648.
46. Id. at 646.
47. See id. at 648-49.
48. Id. at 651.
49. Id. at 651 n.10.
50. See Robert E. Rains, A Pre-History of the Americans with Disabilities Act
and Some Initial Thoughts as to Its Constitutional Implications, 11 ST. Louis U.
PUB. L. REV. 185, 201 (1992); Pawa, supra note 33, at 1062; Sager, supra note 41,
at 1212, 1230.
51. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10.
52. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732 (1982);
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970).
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groups not yet afforded special protection by the Court,53 thus
providing legislation in areas where Congress believes that the
Court has not yet fully recognized Fourteenth Amendment
rights.
2. Rational Basis Test: Traditional Review
Under equal protection analysis, the states retain broad
discretion to classify persons when enacting economic or social
welfare legislation, as long as there is a legitimate state interest
and the classification made is rationally or reasonably related to
furthering that interest. 54 Courts refer to this as the "rational
basis test" or traditional equal protection analysis. 55 Under ra-
tional basis review, there is a strong presumption of constitu-
tionality placed on the governmental action; this grants an
overwhelming amount of deference to the legislature. For ex-
ample, in Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners,56
the Court upheld the constitutionality of a Louisiana state law
that required completion of an apprenticeship as a condition to
becoming a licensed harbor pilot, despite an allegation that ex-
isting pilots selected "only [their] relatives and friends" to serve
as such apprentices.5 7 The Court upheld this socioeconomic law
on the ground that "the benefits to morale and esprit de corps
which family and neighborly tradition might contribute . . .
might have prompted the legislature to permit.., pilot officers
to select those with whom they would serve."58 In such cases
where the rational basis test applies, the Court goes to the ex-
treme of surmising what the legislature might have intended
when enacting the legislation, and if the Court can ascertain
any rational basis for the legislature's action, it will uphold the
statute.5
9
53. See Pawa, supra note 33; see also infra notes 309-25 and accompanying
text.
54. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); Williamson v. Lee Opti-
cal Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
55. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-75
(1980); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
56. 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
57. Id. at 555, 564.
58. Id. at 563 (emphasis added).
59. See Duc Van Le v. Ibarra, No. 91SC189, 1992 WL 77908, at *16 (Colo.
April 20, 1992) (Quinn, J., dissenting) (explaining that under rational basis review,
the Court often evaluates the constitutional validity of various forms of economic
[Vol. 15:621630
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol15/iss2/7
1995] AMERICANS WITH. DISABILITIES ACT 631
3. Strict Scrutiny Standard: Suspect Class Status
The traditional rule, with its extreme deference, does not
apply when a statute classifies people based on race, national-
ity, or alienage. 60 The Court's decisions establish that classifi-
cations based on race, nationality, or alienage are inherently
"suspect" and, thus, subject to "strict scrutiny."61 To overcome
strict scrutiny review, a governmental practice or statute con-
taining suspect classifications must be specifically and narrowly
tailored to further a compelling governmental purpose. 62 As a
standard of judicial review, strict scrutiny is usually "strict in
theory and fatal in fact."63 There have been only a few rare oc-
casions where the Court has strictly scrutinized a statute and
allowed it to survive.64
The Supreme Court first used the term "suspect" in 1944 in
Korematsu v. United States65 to describe a classification based
on race or nationality. Classifying a group as "suspect" does not
infer anything sinister about the group; instead, it refers to the
and social classifications by considering whether there is "any rationally conceiva-
ble set of facts to support the classification"); see also Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S.
635, 642-43 (1986); Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959);
TRIBE, supra note 27, § 16-3, at 1443.
60. The Court has chipped away at the alienage classification since it was
held to be a suspect class in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). As a
result, it remains unclear whether alienage is still an explicit member of the elite
suspect class categories. See generally Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Cabell v.
Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Foley
v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
61. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(nationality).
62. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978).
63. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1976).
64. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (strictly scrutinizing but up-
holding the federal ceiling on contributions to political campaigns); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (strictly scrutinizing but upholding state bans on post-viability
abortions); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (sustaining a military
order excluding Americans of Japanese origin from designated Pacific Coast areas
following the Pearl Harbor attack); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81
(1943) (upholding military curfew on persons of Japanese ancestry on the Pacific
Coast during the early months of World War II).
65. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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motives of the legislature in singling that group out for separate
or different treatment under the law.66 Thus, it is the govern-
ment's "suspect" or suspicious action which the Court closely
scrutinizes.
The Court has stated that to be a suspect class, a group
must have a history or pattern of past discrimination, be pecu-
liarly disadvantaged, be subjected to systematic discriminatory
treatment or otherwise be in need of special solicitude from the
courts. 67 Based on United States v. Carolene Products Co.,68 a
suspect class has come to be known as one that is a "discrete
and insular minority."69 In Carolene Products, Justice Stone ar-
ticulated the theory that discrete and insular minorities often
cannot gain the attention of the legislature.70 This "failure of
the political processes" concept is the basis for courts using a
heightened level of judicial scrutiny: to provide protection to
these minorities that is often missing at the legislative level. 71
As stated above, the Supreme Court has deemed only race,
alienage, and national origin to be worthy of the elite status of
suspect class. 72 All other classifications, including those based
on gender, age, disability, sexual orientation, and economic
standing receive a lower level of scrutiny.73
Once the Court declares a classification to be worthy of sus-
pect class status, that class then receives the greatest protec-
tion the law allows against governmental infringement of equal
66. People v. Green, 148 Misc. 2d 666, 669 n.7, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130, 132 n.7
(Westchester County Ct. 1990).
67. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 219 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
68. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
69. In what has become a very famous footnote by Justice Stone, he stated
that "[pirejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condi-
tion, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordi-
narily relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial scrutiny." Id. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(national origin).
73. See Pawa, supra note 33, at 1077 n.298.
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protection.74 Therefore, laws that classify based on any of these
"suspect classes" are subjected to strict scrutiny.75
For example, in McLaughlin v. Florida,76 the challenged
statute prohibited "any negro man and white woman, or any
white man and negro woman, who are not married to each other
. ." from living in or occupying the same room at night.77 The
Court struck down the statute as violative of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, stating that the classification was based on race,
"which must be viewed in light of the historical fact that the
central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate
racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the
States."78 The Court noted that the background of the Four-
teenth Amendment renders racial classifications "constitution-
ally suspect ... subject to the 'most rigid scrutiny' . . . and 'in
most circumstances irrelevant' to any constitutionally accepta-
ble legislative purpose."79 Therefore, the Court reviews legisla-
tion involving suspect classes using the most rigid scrutiny
possible and, as a result, provides these special classes with the
most judicial protection.
4. Heightened Scrutiny: Quasi-Suspect Status
The courts apply a middle level of review, known as
"heightened" or "intermediate scrutiny,"80 when faced with a
classification based on gender, whether affecting males or fe-
males.81 This is because the Court considers gender a "quasi-
74. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(stating that when a statute classifies based on one of the protected suspect
classes, there is so seldom a legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such
considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy warranting the high-
est protection by the courts-strict scrutiny).
75. See id. (noting that race, alienage, and national origin are suspect classes
and, thus, are entitled to strict scrutiny).
76. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
77. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.05 (repealed by 1969 Fla. Laws ch. 69-195, § 1),
cited in McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 192.
78. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 192.
79. Id. (citations omitted).
80. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (formulating an intermediate level
of scrutiny for gender-based classifications); see also Mississippi Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (where the Court remained committed to intermedi-
ate level of scrutiny of gender-based classifications).
81. See Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (holding that denying a qualified male accept-
ance to an all-female nursing school based solely on his gender violates the Equal
633
13
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:621
suspect" class.82 Heightened scrutiny is more stringent than
the rational basis standard, but less stringent than the strict
scrutiny standard.8 3 Under heightened scrutiny, a gender clas-
sification is held unconstitutional unless it is substantially re-
lated to an important governmental interest.8 4
The Supreme Court developed this middle tier of review as
a compromise when faced with a classification based on gender,
rather than deeming gender to be a suspect class equivalent to
race and national origin.8 5 Since gender, however, is an "immu-
table characteristic" 8 6 like race, and women have been histori-
cally discriminated against, the Court found gender
classifications to warrant some higher standard of scrutiny
than mere rational basis.87
Many statutes are enacted to improve the status of women
in our society, and to counteract old notions of prejudice that
tend to restrict roles and opportunities for women88 If legisla-
tures only enacted this type of "benign" gender discrimination
legislation, then the Court would only need to use rational basis
review when faced with a gender classification; thus, allowing
these remedial statutes to compensate for past prejudices
Protection Clause); Craig, 429 U.S. 190 (holding that the ability of females to
purchase "nonintoxicating" beer at a younger age than males violates the Equal
Protection Clause).
82. The Court has also held illegitimacy to be a "quasi-suspect class." See,
e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495
(1976).
83. See TRIBE, supra note 27, § 16-33, at 1613-14.
84. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724; Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
85. Cf TRIBE, supra note 27, § 16-33, at 1613-14 (stating that rules discrimi-
nating against gender and illegitimacy occupy an intermediate position because
they are subjected to a judicial approach more demanding than rational basis, yet
less demanding than strict scrutiny, which is used to review rules burdening racial
and ancestral minorities).
86. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opin-
ion) (stating that sex is an immutable characteristic and that classifications based
on gender are inherently invidious).
87. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197; Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
88. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)-(c), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)-(c) (1988) (expressly declaring that no employer, labor union, or other
organization subject to the provisions of the Act shall discriminate against any
individual on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) (emphasis
added); Equal Pay Act of 1963 § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988) (providing that no
employer as defined by the Act shall discriminate against employees on the basis
of sex).
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against women.8 9 However, because many differences in treat-
ment based on gender injure the status of women while pur-
porting to do just the opposite, 9° the Court must examine
gender classifications more carefully than rational basis review
warrants. 91
The middle tier approach, therefore, gives a legislature
wishing to combat gender discrimination greater flexibility than
does strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court has held that there are
some occasions where a legislature may enact remedial legisla-
tion to combat past discrimination based on gender, especially
towards women.92 By avoiding strict scrutiny, the Court may
uphold legislation that serves that laudatory purpose. 93 How-
ever, by using a higher standard than rational basis, the Court
can delve into the legislature's motive to see if it was basing its
classification on outdated notions of prejudice. 94
For example, in Craig v. Boren,95 plaintiffs challenged an
Oklahoma statute as a violation of the equal protection rights of
males. The Oklahoma statute prohibited the sale of "nonintoxi-
cating" 3.2% beer to males under twenty-one years of age, but
only to females under eighteen years of age.96 Oklahoma as-
serted traffic safety as its goal for enacting the statute, and of-
fered a number of statistical surveys intended to demonstrate
that females between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one posed
89. See TRIBE, supra note 29, § 16-27 for a discussion of "benign" gender
discrimination.
90. Cf Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441 (noting that "statutes distributing benefits
and burdens between the sexes in different ways very likely reflect outmoded no-
tions of the relative capabilities of men and women").
91. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725-26 (stating that heightened scrutiny is re-
quired "to assure that the validity of a classification is determined through rea-
soned analysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional, often
inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women").
92. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416
U.S. 351 (1974). In both cases, the Supreme Court upheld the use of gender-based
classifications based on the perception that the laws at issue had the laudatory
purpose of remedying disadvantageous conditions women suffered in military and
economic life, thus, acting as compensation for previous deprivations. Schlesinger,
419 U.S. at 508; Kahn, 416 U.S. at 353-54.
93. See Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 508; Kahn, 416 U.S. at 353-54.
94. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725 (stating that "care must be taken in ascertain-
ing whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions").
95. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
96. Id. at 191-92 (citing OKiA. STAT. tit. 37, §§ 241, 245 (West 1958 & Supp.
1976)).
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a lower risk of driving while intoxicated than males under the
age of twenty-one did.97 The Court rejected the state's statisti-
cal evidence as establishing "an unduly tenuous 'fit.' ,,9 The
Court held that the gender based distinction did not closely
serve the legislative objective and, therefore, the distinction
could not withstand the equal protection challenge. 99 Craig,
therefore, extended protection against gender discrimination to
males. Additionally, the Court raised the level of scrutiny that
applies to gender classifications from mere rational basis to a
new category, created by the Craig Court, of heightened scru-
tiny. Since Craig, the Court has firmly established heightened
scrutiny as a third tier of equal protection review. 100
B. Statutory Rights of Persons with Disabilities Prior to the
ADA'01
As Congress stated in the ADA, "historically, society has
tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities,
and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious
and pervasive social problem." 0 2 Individuals with disabilities
have often been excluded from many facets of life within our
society, being stigmatized and ostracized. As one commentator
stated, "[t]he history of society's formal methods for dealing
with handicapped people can be summed up in two words: seg-
regation and inequality."10 3 Often, people with disabilities were
imprisoned, institutionalized, isolated from the community, or
driven from the cities to wander in rural areas. 10 4 Congress
97. Id. at 200-02.
98. Id. at 202.
99. Id. at 200.
100. See, e.g., Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (applying intermediate scrutiny to a classi-
fication based on gender).
101. For an in depth discussion of the history of statutory rights accorded
persons with disabilities, see Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and
Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for
People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1341 (1993).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2).
103. Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis
and Implications of a Second Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 413, 418 n.23 (1991) (citing ROBERT L. BURGDORF, JR., THE LEGAL RIGHTS
OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT 51 (1980)).
104. See ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF
THEIR CARE AND TREATMENT FROM COLONIAL TIMES, 11-23 (2d ed. 1949); Barbara
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first passed federal legislation directly aimed at aiding the dis-
abled in 1918 with the enactment of the Smith-Sears Act (other-
wise known as the Vocational Rehabilitation Act),' 0 5 "[t]o
provide for vocational rehabilitation and return to civil employ-
ment of disabled persons discharged from the military or naval
forces."1 0 6 Thus, the first federal legislation addressing the dis-
abled can be viewed as a legislative attempt to assist World
War I veterans with "overcom[ing] the handicap of [their] disa-
bility," and reentering the work force.'0 7
Two years later, former President Woodrow Wilson signed
the Smith-Fess Act, 08 which was designed, inter alia, "[tlo pro-
vide for the promotion of vocational rehabilitation of persons
disabled in industry or in any legitimate occupation . ,.o"109
Then, in 1936, the Randolph-Sheppard Vending Act was en-
acted to aid blind people in obtaining employment." 0 Subse-
quently, Congress added two more important amendments to
the Vocational Rehabilitation Act, in 1943"' and 1954,112 to pro-
vide funding to increase medical and rehabilitative services for
the disabled.."3 Even a cursory review of these early federal
P. lanacone, Historical Overview: From Charity to Rights, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 953, 953-
54 (1977).
105. Vocational Rehabilitation Act, ch. 107, 40 Stat. 617 (1918) (amended
1919). This Act was based on vocational guidance laws such as the Smith-Hughes
Act of 1917, ch. 114, 39 Stat. 929 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 11-28 (1988
& Supp. V 1993)); Drimmer, supra note 101, at 1364.
106. Vocational Rehabilitation Act, ch. 107, 40 Stat. 617 (1918).
107. Act of July 11, 1919, ch. 12, 41 Stat. 158, 159.
108. Act of June 2, 1920, ch. 219, 41 Stat. 735 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 731-741 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (repealed 1973, and reenacted in the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355)).
109. Id. at 735.
110. Randolph-Sheppard Vending Act, ch. 638, 49 Stat. 1559 (1936) (codified
as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 107 (1988)).
111. Vocational Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1943, ch. 190, 57 Stat. 374,
374-80 (1943) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 31-41 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) (repealed
1973 and reenacted in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat.
355).
112. Vocational Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1954, Pub. L. No. 565, 68
Stat. 652, 652-65.
113. See Assistance and Rehabilitation of the Physically Handicapped: Hear-
ings Before a Special Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1953) (statement of Roy W. Weir) (stating that the purpose of
these amendments was to create "a program of rehabilitating the several million
physically handicapped people in the United States that are a drain upon our re-
sources rather than contributing to production").
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statutes reveals that they were premised on vocational rehabili-
tation, and were not outright anti-discrimination statutes.
In 1968, the Architectural Barriers Act was enacted, re-
quiring all new facilities built with public money to be accessi-
ble to people with disabilities. 114 However, this statute, like the
ones preceding it, was concerned with vocational rehabilitation
and was enacted to ensure that people with disabilities were not
excluded from entering the work force due to physical barri-
ers.115 Also enacted was Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968 (the Fair Housing Act)," 6 which prohibits discrimination
on the basis of disability in matters relating to housing. Addi-
tionally, the Developmental Disabilities Act was enacted, pro-
viding federal funds for community-based living arrangements
for people with developmental disabilities. 1 7 Further, children
with disabilities were guaranteed the right to a free and appro-
priate education through the Education of the Handicapped
Act, enacted in 1975,118 and recently amended and renamed the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, in 1990.119 Yet,
none of these statutes either individually or collectively pro-
vided a comprehensive program outlawing discrimination
against the disabled in our society:
In an attempt to address this problem, Senator Hubert
Humphrey and Representative Charles Vanik, in 1972, at-
tempted to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by adding the
term "physical or mental handicap" to the list of protected
classes. 20 Adding disability to the list of protected classes
114. Pub. L. No. 90-480, 82 Stat. 718 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4151-4157 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
115. Curtis Brewer, Civil Rights Aspects of Disability, in DIsABILrrY: OUR
CHALLENGE 107, 107-23 (John P. Hourihan ed., 1979).
116. The Fair Housing Act of 1968, Title VIII, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81
(as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430,
102 Stat. 1619) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988 & Supp. V
1993)).
117. Pub. L. No. 91-517, 84 Stat. 1316-1324 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2670-2677 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
118. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-
1485 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
119. Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1141, 1142 (1990) (codified at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-1485 (Supp. V 1993)).
120. 118 CONG. REc. 525-26 (1972); see S. REP. No. 316, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
53 (1979) (attempting to add "disability" to the list of protected classes under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
638 [Vol. 15:621
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol15/iss2/7
1995] AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would have made disability
an improper basis for discrimination, similar to that of race and
gender. 121 However, the bill did not get very far. No hearings
were held, and the attempt failed.122
Finally, Congress passed the first large-scale statute deal-
ing with the disabled, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.123 The Act
was passed after opposition from former President Nixon, who
had vetoed two prior versions of the bill before signing it in Sep-
tember of 1973.124 The Rehabilitation Act, which is still in ef-
fect, does not prohibit the private sector from discriminating
against persons with disabilities. 125 It is, therefore, limited in
its scope. The Act was created under the Spending Clause of
the United States Constitution126 to extend only to persons with
disabilities engaged in programs or activities "receiving finan-
cial assistance" from the federal government, 27 or to persons
employed by federal agencies or federal contractors. 128 How-
ever, the Rehabilitation Act did provide persons with disabili-
ties with their first major federal statute designed specifically to
protect them against discrimination by the federal government.
Furthermore, persons with disabilities have used the Act to
121. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to a-6, 2000e to e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) (prohibiting dis-
crimination in public accommodations and employment on the basis of race, color,
creed, national origin, or sex); see also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
122. See Burgdorf, supra note 103, at 429 (postulating that the bill may have
died due to liberal members of Congress who feared that adding "disability" to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 would dilute the protections already afforded by that Act).
123. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973). The anti-discrimination provi-
sions are contained in Title V §§ 501, 503, and 504 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 791,
793, 794 (1988)). Section 501 of the Act prohibits federal employers from discrimi-
nating against persons with disabilities; § 503 prohibits employers having con-
tracts with the federal government in excess of $2,500 from discriminating against
persons with disabilities; § 504 prohibits recipients of federal financial assistance
from discriminating against persons with disabilities. Id.
124. See Rains, supra note 50, at 189.
125. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793-794 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (applicable only to
federal employers, those contracting with the federal government in excess of
$2,500, and recipients of federal financial assistance).
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Spending Clause reads: "The Congress
shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States." Id.
127. 29 U.S.C. § 794.
128. Id. §§ 791, 793.
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champion their rights by challenging alleged discriminatory ac-
tion against them, although not always with success. 129
In addition to these federal statutes, many states also have
laws that prevent some forms of discrimination against persons
with disabilities. 130 However, these state laws have failed, for
129. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am.,
477 U.S. 597 (1986) (holding that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, prohibiting dis-
crimination against disabled individuals in any program or activity receiving fi-
nancial assistance, does not apply to commercial airlines); Consolidated Rail Corp.
v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984) (holding that a suit for back pay could be main-
tained under the Rehabilitation Act for employment discrimination based on disa-
bility); Gottfried v. FCC, 655 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that the
Rehabilitation Act does not require the Federal Communications Commission to
review a public television station's license renewal application under a different
standard than that which applies to a commercial licensee's renewal application
and, therefore, the FCC was acting within its authority when it declined to impose
a greater obligation to provide special programming for the hearing impaired on a
public licensee than it did on commercial licensees), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Community Television v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498 (1983); Southeastern Com-
munity College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (holding that the college did not en-
gage in illegal discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act by denying a hearing
impaired individual admission to the college's nursing program when that individ-
ual was not an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" within the meaning of
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); Camenisch v. University of Texas, 616 F.2d
127 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that the district court properly granted injunctive re-
lief directing the University of Texas, under the Rehabilitation Act, to procure and
compensate a qualified interpreter to assist plaintiff, a deaf graduate student, in
his classes during the 1978 school term), vacated on other grounds, 451 U.S. 390
(1981).
130. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.210 (1991) (declaring that the opportunity
to obtain employment, credit and financing, public accommodations, housing ac-
commodations and other property without discrimination because of physical or
mental disability is a civil right); AIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1492.02 (Supp. 1993)
(prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability in public accommodations and
commercial facilities); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1492.05 (Supp. 1993) (prohibit-
ing discrimination based on disability in public transportation services provided by
private entities); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994)
(prohibiting discrimination based on disability in employment); MIcH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 37.1202 (West 1985) (prohibiting discrimination based on handicap in em-
ployment); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:12 (Supp. 1993) (prohibiting discrimina-
tion based on disability in housing); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 354-A:17 (Supp. 1993)
(prohibiting discrimination based on disability in public accommodations); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-29.1 (West 1993) (stating that it is an unlawful employment
practice to deny to an otherwise qualified handidapped, blind, or deaf person the
opportunity to obtain or maintain employment); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-29.2 (West
1993) (prohibiting housing discrimination against handicapped, blind, or deaf per-
sons); N.Y. Civ. RIGrrs LAW art. 4-B (McKinney 1992) (recognizing a broad range
of civil rights, including specific rights for people with disabilities who use guide,
hearing, or service dogs); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 290 (McKinney 1993) (prohibiting dis-
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the most part, to provide substantial relief, leaving persons
with disabilities in an inferior position in our society.131 As a
result, until the ADA, the majority of employers, program ad-
ministrators, owners and managers of places of public accom-
modation, and most others were free to discriminate at will
against people with disabilities without concern of redress. 132
The ADA, therefore, was to reflect a dramatic change in the
rights of the disabled.
C. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center'3 represents the
only occasion in which the issue of suspect or quasi-suspect sta-
crimination against persons with disabilities in many areas, including employ-
ment, housing, and public accommodations); TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 21.051
(West Supp. 1994) (prohibiting discrimination based on disability in employment);
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-715 (Michie 1987) (declaring that it is the policy of the Com-
monwealth of Virginia to safeguard all individuals from unlawful discrimination
because of disability in places of public accommodation and in employment); VA.
CODE ANN. § 51.5-40 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1994) (stating that no qualified person
with a disability shall be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving state financial assistance or conducted by any state agency); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 49.60.030 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994) (declaring that the right to be
free from discrimination because of any sensory, mental, or physical disability is a
civil right which includes the right to obtain and hold employment, to enjoy public
accommodations, and to engage in real estate transactions). See also Rains, supra
note 50, at 189 n.30 (stating that by 1986, forty-three states and the District of
Columbia had passed statutes to protect disabled individuals from private employ-
ment discrimination).
131. See Tucker, supra note 15, at 16 n.7; see also Larry M. Schumaker, The
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 47 J. Mo. B. 542 (Oct.-Nov. 1991) (ex-
plaining that despite the prevalence of state laws addressing disability discrimina-
tion, there was not a widespread awareness that disability discrimination was
illegal until the ADA was passed); the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (5) & (6) (finding
that "individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimi-
nation, including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of archi-
tectural, transportation, and communication barriers, ... [and that] people with
disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely
disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally").
132. See Tucker, supra note 15, at 16 n.7; see also the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101
(a)(4) (finding that "unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the
basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals with disabili-
ties have often had no legal recourse to redress discrimination against them"); Act
of June 16, 1992, ch. 224, § 1(A), 1992 Ariz. Sess. Laws 941, 941 (stating that
"discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in critical areas of
public accommodations, transportation and access to public services, and that
these individuals often have had no legal recourse to redress this discrimination").
133. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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tus of any disabled group has come squarely before the Supreme
Court. In Cleburne, the City of Cleburne, Texas required a spe-
cial use permit for the operation of a group home for the men-
tally retarded.134 The city, after holding a public hearing,
prohibited the formation of the group home based on a munici-
pal zoning ordinance that required a permit to be issued for the
construction of "[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-minded
. ... "135 The city claimed its interest in forcing the proposed
group home to obtain a special use permit was, among other
things, the negative attitude of nearby property owners, the
proposed home's proximity to a junior high school, and the size
of the home and the number of people to be housed there. 13 6
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that mental re-
tardation was a quasi-suspect class, and that therefore, the
Cleburne ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause be-
cause it did not "substantially further an important governmen-
tal purpose."137
The Supreme Court, however, overturned the Fifth Cir-
cuit's ruling, finding that the mentally retarded did not consti-
tute a quasi-suspect class for purposes of equal protection
review. 138 Instead, the Court specifically found the lesser ra-
tional basis standard to be the appropriate level of review for
statutes affecting the mentally retarded, a sub-group of the dis-
abled. 3 9 Despite this ruling, the Court struck down the ordi-
nance and concluded that singling out the mentally retarded
group home by requiring a special use permit rested on "[an
irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded . . .140
Thus, the Court found that the city's classification was not "ra-
tionally related to a legitimate governmental purpose" as is re-
quired under rational basis review. 141 The Court reached its
conclusion by examining the record and finding that it did not
134. Id. at 435-36.
135. Id. at 436-37.
136. Id. at 448-49. The municipal zoning ordinance also required the signa-
tures of all property owners within two hundred feet of the property to be obtained,
and limited the special use permits to one year. Id. at 436 n.9.
137. Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 193 (5th Cir.
1984).
138. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442.
139. Id. at 435, 446.
140. Id. at 450.
141. Id. at 446, 450.
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support the particular classification, since other, similar uses
faced no such requirement of a special use permit.142
As previously discussed, application of the rational basis
standard involves the Court's granting almost complete defer-
ence to the legislature, without delving into the legislative mo-
tive. 143 This deference may be the result of judicial recognition
of the difficulty in determining legislative motive, or the result
of a general belief in judicial restraint. 144 However, in Cleburne,
the Court used a more sharply focused rational basis review in
examining the statute. 146 Instead of deferring to the legisla-
ture, the Court actually scrutinized the legislative record,
146
something normally not done when applying the rational basis
standard. There have been other occasions, in addition to
Cleburne, where the Court has strayed from the traditional def-
erential approach, and has instead applied rational basis with a
"sharper focus" 147 (or as some have called it, a form of height-
ened scrutiny sub silentio'48), striking down legislation even
142. Id. at 450. The Court noted that the city did not require a special use
permit for hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes for convalescents or the aged
(other than for the insane, feeble-minded, alcoholics, or drug addicts), boarding
and lodging houses, fraternity and sorority houses, and many other uses. Id.
143. See generally United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166
(1980); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297
(1976) (per curiam).
144. TRIBE, supra note 27, § 16-2, at 1440; see also infra note 350 for a defini-
tion of judicial restraint.
145. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the majority definitely used a form of
heightened scrutiny because the ordinance surely would have been valid if ana-
lyzed under the traditional rational basis test); see also infra note 272.
146. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
147. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (not-
ing that "the relatively deferential 'rational basis' standard of review normally ap-
plied takes on a sharper focus when [the Court] address[es] a gender-based
classification"); see also Mayfield v. Ford, 664 F. Supp. 1285, 1289 n.3 (D. Neb.
1987) (recognizing the existence of "case law suggesting that the level of scrutiny
given to cases involving the mentally impaired is more properly defined as a ra-
tional basis with 'a sharper focus'") (citing Hickey v. Morris, 722 F.2d 543, 546
(9th Cir. 1984) (noting that "recent decisions indicate that the [Supreme] Court
sometimes applies the rational basis test with 'a sharper focus' ") (citing Craig, 429
U.S. at 210 n.*; Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982); Michael M. v.
Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 468-69 (1981))).
148. See Pawa, supra note 33, at 1077 (using the phrase "heightened scrutiny
standard sub silentio" to refer to the Court's use of heightened scrutiny under the
guise of rational basis).
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under the lowest standard of review. 149 The Court's failure to
apply the traditional deferential approach in these situations
seems to be a judicial response to statutes creating distinctions
among classes that the Court deems "suspect" in nature, but yet
appears unwilling to label as such.150 The Court's failure to
openly acknowledge its use of heightened scrutiny unfortu-
nately submits these classes to the subjective discretion of
judges operating with multiple standards of review, all mas-
querading as the rational basis standard.1 1
III. The Rights of Person with Disabilities Since the
Enactment of the ADA
A. The Americans with Disabilities Act 152
The ADA was signed into law by former President George
Bush on July 26, 1990.153 As noted by President Bush upon
signing the ADA, "[iit signals the end to the unjustified segrega-
tion and exclusion of persons with disabilities from the main-
stream of American life."15 4  For the forty-three million
Americans with disabilities, 155 the ADA has been proclaimed to
be the "Emancipation Proclamation" for the disabled, 156 and
149. The Court's use of heightened scrutiny under the guise of rational basis
can be found in several cases. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974)
(overturning a New York law which allowed incarcerated persons to vote by absen-
tee ballot only if confined in a county where they were not a resident); United
States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (invalidating a statute with-
holding food stamps from households where members were not related).
150. Cf TRIBE, supra note 27, § 16-3, at 1444-46 (arguing that although there
may be grounds for the Court's reluctance to add new categories overtly triggering
heightened or strict scrutiny, the Court's covert use of this heightened form of
scrutiny under the rational basis label presents dangers of arbitrariness).
151. See id.
152. It should be noted that even though enacted in 1990, the ADA has
different effective dates for each of its major titles, the earliest of which is January
26, 1992. For a concise explanation of the effective dates, see John W. Parry, The
Americans With Disabilities Act, Effective Dates In Each Title, 15 MENTAL &
PHYsIcAL DISABILITY L. REP. 13 (Jan.-Feb. 1991).
153. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12,213 (Supp. V 1993)).
154. People v. Green, 148 Misc. 2d 666, 670, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130, 133 (Westches-
ter County Ct. 1990) (quoting Statement by former President George Bush upon
signing S. 933, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601, 602).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(1).
156. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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July 26, 1990 has been called "Liberation Day for the Disabled
"157
Congress stated that the purpose of the ADA is "to provide
a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimina-
tion of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."158
Congress intended to do this by "invok[ing] the sweep of con-
gressional authority, including the power to enforce the
[Flourteenth [A]mendment and to regulate commerce, in order
to address the major areas faced daily by people with disabili-
ties."1 59 The ADA extends to the private sector under the Com-
merce Clause of the United States Constitution,160 and to state
and local governments under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Enabling Clause.161 Thus, the provisions of
the ADA extend to a wide range of entities, such as restaurants,
hotels, doctors' offices, retail stores, museums, libraries, parks,
private schools, and theaters. 62 However, the ADA does not
cover the executive branch of the federal government, which
continues to be covered by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.163
The ADA does, however, apply to Congress and its instrumen-
talities.164 The ADA contains five major titles prohibiting dis-
crimination against persons with disabilities: Title I prohibits
discrimination in the area of employment; 65 Title II in public
157. Stephen Chapman, Waving a Magic Wand at the Needs of the Handi-
capped, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 24, 1989, at 3.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
159. Id. § 12101(b)(4).
160. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. The ADA defines commerce as: "travel, trade,
traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication-among the several States;
between any foreign country or any territory or possession and any State; or be-
tween points in the same State but through another State or foreign country." 42
U.S.C. § 12181(1).
161. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see supra note 24 for the full text of Section
Five.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Under 42 U.S.C. § 12187, private clubs and reli-
gious organizations are exempted from the ADA's provisions.
163. See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 12209(c)(4). Congress and its instrumentalities include the
Architect of the Capitol, the Congressional Budget Office, the General Accounting
Office, the Government Printing Office, the Library of Congress, the Office of Tech-
nology Assessment, and the United States Botanical Garden. Id.
165. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, 330-37 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12111-12117 (Supp. V. 1993)).
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services;16 Title III in public accommodations;16 7 Title IV in
telecommunications;'16 and Title V includes various miscellane-
ous provisions concerning the scope of the ADA.169
1. Disability Defined
The ADA follows the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, its prede-
cessor, in defining the term "disabled." Interpretation of a disa-
bility under the Rehabilitation Act, therefore, is likely to shape
interpretation of the definition under the ADA. A disabled indi-
vidual under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act is one
who has "a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more" of that individual's major life activities, has
"a record of such an impairment," or is "regarded as having such
an impairment."170 For example, both the ADA and the Reha-
bilitation Act cover a deaf individual, an individual disfigured
by burns, a Vietnam veteran with a severed hand, a cured can-
cer victim still regarded as having cancer, and any other indi-
vidual who has a disability or is regarded as having one. 171 This
is a broad definition and one the courts have had to grapple
with often under the Rehabilitation Act. 172 Under the Rehabili-
tation Act, the question of defining who fits into the category of
a "handicapped person" has been decided by the courts purely
166. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, 337-53 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12131-12165 (Supp. V. 1993)).
167. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, 353-65 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12181-12189 (Supp. V. 1993)).
168. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, 366-69 (1990) (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 225, 611 (Supp. II 1990)).
169. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, 369-78 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12201-12213 (Supp. V. 1993)). For a thorough analysis of the ADA's provisions,
see Tucker, supra note 15.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C); 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(A) (1988).
171. See Tucker, supra note 15, at 18.
172. See, e.g., School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (tu-
berculosis); Rezza v. United States Dep't of Justice, 56 U.S.L.W. 2686 (E.D. Pa.
1988) (compulsive gambler); Blackwell v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 830
F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (sexual preference); Heron v. McGuire, 803 F.2d 67 (2d
Cir. 1986) (heroin addict). AIDS has been widely recognized as a disability under
the Rehabilitation Act. See Robert A. Kushen, Asymptomatic Infection with the
AIDS Virus as a Handicap under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
563 (1988). For a general discussion of the meaning of handicap under the Reha-
bilitation Act, see David A. Larson, What Disabilities Are Protected Under The Re-
habilitation Act of 1978?, 16 MEMPH. ST. U. L. REv. 229 (1986).
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on a case-by-case basis. 173 By contrast, the ADA limits the defi-
nition of a disabled person by excluding certain "disabilities"
from the statute's coverage. These exceptions include homosex-
uality, bisexuality, transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia,
exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not result-
ing from physical impairments, sexual behavior disorders, com-
pulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, and psychoactive
substance use disorders resulting from the current illegal use of
drugs.174 In addition, the ADA expressly includes alcoholics
(both rehabilitated and non-rehabilitated) under the definition
of a disabled individual, 175 whereas sections 503 and 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act (through the 1978 amendments) exclude cur-
rent alcohol or drug users whose use affects their job perform-
ance or the safety of others.176
B. The Present Conflict Among Federal and State Courts
Regarding the Status of Persons with Disabilities
The enactment of the ADA has resulted in confusion and
conflict among federal and state courts with regard to the
proper status to be given to persons with disabilities by the na-
tion's courts, and what role the ADA should play in their deci-
sions. The following selected cases highlight this conflict.
1. Courts Using the ADA as a Guide to Interpretation of
Other Federal and State Legislation
Although the ADA was passed in 1990, its earliest effective
date was not until January 26, 1992.177 Consequently, very lit-
tle case law has been generated interpreting the provisions of
the ADA. Nonetheless, some courts have used the ADA to guide
their interpretation of state and federal legislation, finding that
persons with disabilities are entitled to special protection or sol-
ace from the courts.
173. Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cir. 1986).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(a), (b)(1)-(3).
175. Id. § 12114(c).
176. 29 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794 (1988).
177. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181; see also Parry, supra note 152, for effective dates
of each title of the ADA.
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a. People v. Green: The ADA as a Guide to
Interpretation of a State Constitution
Some courts have looked to the ADA to guide their rulings
when faced with governmental action based on disability. For
example, in People v. Green,178 a New York trial court opined
that disabled persons in general, and hearing impaired persons
in particular, could constitute a "suspect classification" entitled
to the strict judicial scrutiny standard in view of the protections
afforded them by New York law. 179 In Green, the court forbade
an assistant district attorney from exercising a peremptory
challenge to exclude a deaf person from jury service based solely
on the juror's disability and not on any doubt of the juror's abil-
ity to communicate. 80 The court held that the peremptory chal-
lenge would violate the juror's right to equal protection of the
laws under the New York State Constitution.' 8'
Furthermore, the court stated that the ADA "must also be
heeded even if not yet effective, and whether or not it would
apply to comparable situations in the future."18 2 The court
noted that the term "public entity" as defined by the ADA in-
cluded "any department, agency.., or other instrumentality of
a State or States or local government" and, therefore, would ap-
ply to both the district attorney's office and the court. 83 The
178. 148 Misc. 2d 666, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130 (Westchester County Ct. 1990).
179. Id. at 669, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 132. The court listed several New York stat-
utes, such as N.Y. ExEc. LAw §§ 290-292, 296 (McKinney 1982), N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS
LAw § 47 (McKinney 1976), and N.Y. JuD. LAw § 390 (McKinney 1983), as well as
the New York State Constitution, that afford protection to people with disabilities.
Green, 148 Misc. 2d at 669, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 132.
180. Id. at 669, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 133.
181. Id. at 668, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 132. Section 11 of article I of the New York
Constitution provides:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or
any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, creed or
religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other
person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any
agency or subdivision of the state.
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. The court in Green found that the deaf juror did not fall
into any of the categories mentioned in the second sentence of this section, but
stated that it was still possible for her to have been denied equal protection under
the first sentence if she was excluded from serving as a juror solely because of her
disability. Green, 148 Misc. 2d at 668, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 132.
182. Green, 148 Misc. 2d at 670, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 133.
183. Id.
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court stated that the deaf individual would be considered a
"qualified individual" under the ADA, and would be permitted
to use a qualified interpreter while serving as a juror.18 4 The
court concluded that the district attorney and the court should
not contribute to keeping this individual from serving on a jury
solely because of her deafness, when no inability to serve had
been shown or even suggested. 185
The court ultimately ruled against the district attorney,
finding that his action did not survive the court's rational basis
review.18' Consequently, the court's actual holding did not rely
on strict scrutiny, but the court curiously engaged in a lengthy
discussion of suspect class status and strict scrutiny in dicta. 8 7
Despite the judge's comments that the ADA was influential to
his decision, and that under the ADA the disabled should be
considered a suspect class, these comments were merely dicta
because the ADA was not in effect at the time of the judge's
ruling. Therefore, Green is an example of a state court using
the ADA as an aid in its interpretation of a state's laws and
constitution, but with the caveat that its interpretation of the
ADA as transforming the disabled into a suspect class was not
dispositive of the outcome in the case.
b. Trautz v. Weisman: The ADA as a Guide to
Interpretation of other Federal Legislation
Courts have also used the ADA as a guideline to essentially
reinterpret other federal statutes concerned with discrimina-
tion. For example, in Trautz v. Weisman,188 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York addressed
the question of whether the disabled were to be considered a
"class" under the conspiracy provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).189
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 669, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 132.
187. See id.
188. 819 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988). Section 1985(3) provides in relevant part:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on
the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving,
either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal pro-
tection of the laws.., the party so injured or deprived may have an action
for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation,
against any one or more of the conspirators.
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The plaintiffs were a group of disabled persons residing at an
adult care facility who claimed that the defendant owners con-
spired to deny them equal protection of the laws based on their
disability. 190 Defendants attacked plaintiff's § 1985(3) claim al-
leging that the plaintiffs, a group of disabled individuals, were
not members of any protected class and, thus, the action should
be dismissed. 191 Courts interpreting § 1985(3) have stated that
"there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' ac-
tions" for a § 1985(3) action to lie. 192 In addition, courts have
held that the protection under § 1985(3) extends to the "discrete
and insular" minorities who receive special protection under the
Equal Protection Clause because of inherent personal charac-
teristics. 193 The Trautz court found that:
whether or not a disability is apparent to the naked eye or re-
quires a medical examination to diagnose, it remains an inherent
personal characteristic .... [A] disability by its very nature is an
immutable obstacle often created only by an accident of birth, not
unlike race, gender, or national origin, which cannot be erased,
but must be surmounted. 94
The court recognized that the "idea of equal protection is en-
shrined in both [s]ection 1985(3) and the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment," and that its opinion, though not governed by
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, is definitely guided by
it.195
Id.
190. Trautz, 819 F. Supp. at 290. The Trautz court set forth the requirements
for a § 1985(3) action as follows:
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), plaintiffs must show: (1) a con-
spiracy; (2) for the purposes of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons to the equal protection of the laws; and (3) an act
in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is injured in his per-
son or property or deprived of any right or privileges of a citizen of the
United States.
Id.
191. Id.
192. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
193. See Browder v. Tipton, 630 F.2d 1149, 1150 (6th Cir. 1980).
194. Trautz, 819 F. Supp. at 292.
195. Id. at 291; see also Triad Assocs. v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 892 F.2d 583,
593 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845 (1990).
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The court noted that a number of cases have held that the
disabled do not constitute a "class" for purposes of § 1985(3) pro-
tection, 196 but that nearly all of those cases predated the recent
enactment of the ADA.197 The court found that, to the extent
that those cases rely upon conclusions that people with disabili-
ties are not a class historically discriminated against, they are
undercut by the ADA.198 The court stated that "[t]he ADA rep-
resents a comprehensive national mandate to eliminate dis-
crimination against [people] with disabilities, [and w]hile it
may not provide heightened scrutiny for discrimination against
individuals with disabilities under the Equal Protection Clause,
it is relevant to Congress' [own intended] interpretation of
§ 1985(3)." 199 The court noted that § 1985(3) has been held to
cover discrimination claims against classes other than race
where courts have defined the class as a suspect or quasi-sus-
pect class, or where Congress, by legislation, has indicated an
intent that the class be given special protection.2°° The Trautz
court noted that Congress explicitly identified persons with dis-
abilities as a discrete and insular minority; therefore, in order
to give effect to both federal statutes-the ADA and § 1985(3)-
it read them harmoniously, concluding that the disabled would
now qualify as a protected class under § 1985(3).201 As a result,
the court held that a class of individuals with disabilities may
be protected by § 1985(3), and refused to grant the defendant's
motion to dismiss.22
As demonstrated, the courts have used the ADA as a guide
to interpreting other federal discrimination statutes. These
196. Trautz, 819 F. Supp. at 292 (citing, inter alia, D'Amato v. Wisconsin Gas
Co., 760 F.2d 1474, 1486-87 (7th Cir. 1985); Wilhelm v. Continental Title Co., 720
F.2d 1173, 1176-77 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103 (1984); Downs v.
Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978); Herhold
v. City of Chicago, 723 F. Supp. 20, 35 (N.D. 111. 1989); Kolpak v. Bell, 619 F. Supp.
359, 373 (N.D. Ill. 1985)).
197. Trautz, 819 F. Supp. at 293.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 294.
200. Id.
201. Id. (citing Congress' language in 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) describing the
disabled as a "discrete and insular minority with a history of purposeful unequal
treatment"); see also Chatoff v. City of New York, No. 92 Civ. 0604, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21662, at *1 (S.D.N.Y June 26, 1992) (quoting a congressional statement
identifying the disabled as a discrete and insular minority).
202. Trautz, 819 F. Supp. at 295.
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courts have held that the ADA raises the status of the disabled
to that of other classes historically discriminated against, such
as race and gender, in the context of the application of those
statutes.
2. Courts Choosing Not to Use the ADA to Confer Special
Status on the Disabled
Several courts have reviewed the issue of whether persons
with disabilities are a suspect or quasi-suspect class since the
enactment of the ADA, and have found that they are not. Sig-
nificantly, in two of the cases highlighted below, the courts spe-
cifically noted that their refusal to accord suspect or quasi-
suspect class status to the disabled does not implicate the ADA
because it was not yet in effect at the time of the underlying
injury or at the time of trial. However, a third case specifically
rejected the theory that the ADA has transformed the disabled
into a suspect or quasi-suspect class. According to that court,
the ADA does not change the status of the disabled for purposes
of equal protection review.
a. Tomsha v. City of Colorado Springs
Tomsha v. City of Colorado Springs203 demonstrates how
some courts have dismissed the question of whether the dis-
abled constitute a suspect class by declaring the ADA inapplica-
ble based solely on its effective date. In Tomsha, a workers'
compensation case, petitioner challenged the constitutionality
of the Colorado work-related stress statute2 4 as violative of the
Equal Protection Clause. 20 5 The statute required the testimony
of a licensed physician or psychologist to support a claim for
emotional or mental stress.206 The petitioner, a stress-disabled
claimant, contended that the workers' compensation statute vi-
olated equal protection guarantees because it subjected stress-
disabled claimants to a higher burden of proof than other claim-
203. 856 P.2d 13 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
204. Workers' Compensation Act of Colorado, ch. 62, 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws
468, 479 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-41-301(2)(a) (Supp.
1992)).
205. Tomsha, 856 P.2d at 13.
206. Id. at 14.
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ants and, therefore, was discriminatory as applied.20 7 Addition-
ally, petitioner claimed that the court should subject the
statutory classification of stress-claimants to strict scrutiny be-
cause disabled persons are a suspect class under the ADA.208
The Court of Appeals of Colorado, however, rejected the
plaintiff's claim that disabled persons are a suspect class under
the ADA, and based this decision solely on the fact that the
plaintiff had been injured before the effective date of the
ADA. 20 9 Instead, the court upheld the statute under the ra-
tional basis test, concluding that verification of the mental com-
ponent of a stress claim by a physician or psychologist was
rationally related to the legitimate legislative purpose of at-
tempting to prevent frivolous and unnecessary claims.210 The
court did not suggest how it would have decided this challenge
to the workers compensation statute if the ADA had been in
effect at the time of petitioner's injury. Therefore, Tomsha pro-
vides no guidance as to how other courts should decide this
issue.
b. Contractors Association v. City of Philadelphia
The case of Contractors Association v. City of Philadel-
phia21 ' demonstrates how a court specifically refused to afford
the disabled quasi-suspect status in an affirmative action equal
protection claim brought subsequent to the passage of the ADA.
In Contractors, the City of Philadelphia enacted an ordinance 212
to increase participation in city contracts by "disadvantaged
business enterprises" (DBEs). 213 DBEs were considered to be
those enterprises at least fifty-one percent owned by "socially
and economically disadvantaged individuals," which included
those individuals who had been subjected to racial, sexual, or
ethnic prejudice or differential treatment because of a
disability.214
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 15.
211. 6 F.3d 990 (1993).
212. PHILA. PA., CODE § 17-500 (1982).
213. Contractors, 6 F.3d at 993.
214. Id. at 994 (citing PHILA. PA., CODE § 17-501).
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On April 14, 1989, nine contractors associations brought
suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania challenging the Philadelphia ordinance as vio-
lative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.215 The district court granted summary judgment for the
contractors, invalidating the ordinance under the strict scrutiny
standard as it applied to racial preferences; 216 under the inter-
mediate scrutiny as it applied to gender preferences; 217 and
under rational basis review as it applied to preferences for busi-
nesses owned by persons with disabilities. 218 The City of Phila-
delphia appealed, but the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
vacated the district court's judgment on the merits as prema-
ture because of outstanding discovery between the parties, and
remanded the case back to the district court.219 On remand, the
district court reaffirmed its prior decision. 220 Once again, the
City of Philadelphia appealed to the Third Circuit.221
On appeal, the court of appeals reviewed the contractor's
challenge with regard to the preferences the ordinance gave to
businesses owned and operated by racial minorities, women,
and disabled individuals. 22 2 The court applied strict scrutiny to
the preference given to racial minorities, 22 reversing the dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment to the extent it invali-
dated that portion of the ordinance.2 24 As for the gender
preferences contained in the ordinance, the court applied inter-
mediate scrutiny,2 25 affirming the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment invalidating the gender preference for
construction contracts. 226
215. See id.
216. See id. at 995.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See Contractors Ass'n v. City of Phila., 945 F.2d 1260, 1268 (3d Cir.
1991).
220. See Contractors, 6 F.3d at 995.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 999.
223. Id. at 999-1000.
224. Id. at 1009.
225. Id. at 1000-01 (relying on Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718 (1982)).
226. Id. at 1011.
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As the district court had, the appellate court reviewed the
preference for disabled business owners under the rational ba-
sis test.227 In selecting this standard of review, the appellate
court relied on Cleburne as authority.228 The contractors,
although acknowledging that Cleburne applied rational basis
review, contended that the court should have reviewed the pref-
erence for disabled business owners under some form of height-
ened scrutiny.229 The contractors stated that Cleburne is
"obviously contrary to the sense of American society as a whole"
given the ADA.2 ° In short, the contractors asserted that the
ADA overruled Cleburne and, therefore, required the circuit
court to apply heightened scrutiny to the preference for disabled
business owners.2 1
The circuit court disagreed. Although the court cited from
the congressional findings in the ADA, where Congress ex-
pressly found the disabled to be a "discrete and insular minor-
ity,"23 2 the Contractors court refused to extend heightened
scrutiny to the disabled.23 The appellate court stated that the
contractors offered no evidence to bolster their argument that
the ADA had overruled Cleburne.23 4 Furthermore, the appellate
court cited More v. Farrier,35 where the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit refused to extend heightened scrutiny to the
disabled, stating that the ADA does not "alter the standard for
constitutional equal protection claims."23 6 Therefore, the appel-
late court held that the district court chose the proper standard
to review the ordinance's preference for disabled persons-ra-
tional basis.23 7
Accordingly, the appellate court upheld the ordinance's
preference for disabled business owners under the rational ba-
sis standard, finding that the ordinance would encourage dis-
227. Id. at 1001.
228. Id. (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 445
(1985)).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. 984 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1993).
236. Id. at 271 n.4.
237. Contractors, 6 F.3d at 1001.
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abled persons to form businesses to win city contracts. 238 Thus,
the appellate court reversed the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment invalidating that portion of the ordinance per-
taining to disabled business owners. 239
Therefore, Contractors is the only example of a court
squarely refusing to grant special status to the disabled subse-
quent to the enactment of the ADA. The Third Circuit specifi-
cally dismissed the contention that the ADA overruled
Cleburne, maintaining that rational basis is the proper stan-
dard to be applied in cases classifying based on disability.
c. Duc Van Le v. Ibarra
The case of Duc Van Le v. Ibarra240 presents the confusion
some courts have encountered when faced with an equal protec-
tion claim based on disability. Duc Van Le began at the trial
level in the Denver District Court of Colorado as a class action
suit, brought on behalf of a class of low income mentally ill per-
sons.241 The mentally ill class of persons alleged that the de-
fendants, administrators of the Colorado Department of Social
Services, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
by failing to provide the mentally ill persons with the same
Home and Community-Based Services (HCBS) program that
was provided to the elderly, blind, and physically disabled. 2
The trial court, applying both strict scrutiny and rational basis
review, found that the state failed to show either a compelling
(strict scrutiny) or a legitimate (rational basis) governmental
interest for its denial of social services benefits to the mentally
ill class of persons. 243 The trial court further held that the men-
tally retarded are entitled to the same HCBS programs that the
state currently provides to the elderly, blind, and physically dis-
abled persons. 244 The trial court concluded that the state dis-
238. Id. at 1012.
239. Id.
240. No. 91SC189, 1992 WL 77908 (Colo. Apr. 20, 1992) (Opinion ordered
withdrawn on grant of rehearing May 28, 1992, and judgment of the district court
affirmed by operation of law, Duc Van Le v. Ibarra, 843 P.2d 15, 16 (1992).).
241. No. 88CV22641, slip op. at 1-2 (Denver Dist. Ct. Aug. 23, 1990).
242. 1992 WL 77908, at *1.
243. Id. at *5.
244. Id.
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criminated against the mentally retarded class in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution
and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.245 In a decision and
order dated August 23, 1990, the trial court ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs on both claims and ordered the state social services
program to provide HCBS benefits to the mentally ill class so
long as the state provides HCBS benefits to elderly, blind and
physically disabled persons.246 The Colorado Department of So-
cial Services appealed and the Supreme Court of Colorado
granted certiorari to determine whether the Equal Protection
Clause or § 504 forbids Colorado from offering HCBS benefits to
elderly, blind, and physically disabled persons without offering
the same services to mentally ill persons.247
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the
judgment of the trial court, holding that the state did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
by refusing to provide HCBS benefits to the mentally ill class of
persons. 248 The court refused to apply strict scrutiny to the Col-
orado government's action or hold that mentally ill persons are
a suspect or quasi-suspect class, citing Cleburne as authority. 249
The court stated that "to declare the mentally ill to be a suspect
or quasi-suspect class would be contrary to previous decisions of
the United States Supreme Court that have interpreted the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution."250
The court further stated that the Supreme Court has so far set
out only three categories which it terms suspect classes: race,
alienage, and national origin; and two categories it terms quasi-
suspect classes: gender and illegitimacy. 25' The court quoted at
length from the congressional findings of the ADA, which de-
scribe the disabled as a discrete and insular minority.252 How-
ever, the court dismissed the ADA as inapplicable because the
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at *2.
248. Id. at *12.
249. Id. at *8 (citing City ofCleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,
446 (1985)). The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim under § 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act based on the fact that the HCBS waiver program did not receive
federal funds, a prerequisite to triggering the application of § 504. Id. at *12.
250. Id. at *9.
251. Id. (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41).
252. Id.
657
37
PACE LAW REVIEW
case was not brought under the ADA and the ADA was not in
effect at the time of the trial in the lower court.253
The mentally ill plaintiffs then petitioned the Supreme
Court of Colorado for a rehearing, which was denied on Decem-
ber 14, 1992.254 The court was equally divided on the issues in-
volved in the case and, as a consequence, the judgment of the
district court was affirmed by operation of law.255 As a result,
the original trial court decision--that the state had violated the
mentally ill persons' rights in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act-has become the
controlling decision in this case. The state social services pro-
gram then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari. The Court denied the writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Colorado in January 1994.256 Therefore, the
question of whether the disabled now constitute a suspect or
quasi-suspect class due to the enactment of the ADA has once
again been left unanswered.
IV. Analysis
A. Elements of the Court's Decision in Cleburne
Americans with disabilities have been lobbying the nation's
courts for decades to raise the status of the disabled to that of a
suspect class, albeit unsuccessfully. 257 The Supreme Court,
however, has only analyzed whether the disabled are to be af-
forded special status under the Equal Protection Clause on one
occasion. 258
253. Id.
254. 843 P.2d 15, 16 (Colo. 1992).
255. Id. at 16. Justices Lohr, Quinn, and Kirshbaum favored affirmance of
the judgment of the Denver District Court. Id. Chief Justice Rovira, Justices Er-
ickson and Mullarkey favored reversal. Id. Justice Vollack did not participate. Id.
Justice Erickson stated, "we were equally divided on the resolution of the issues in
this case and the judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the operation of law."
Id. at 17 (Erickson J., dissenting); see also People ex rel. Link v. Tucker, 42 P.2d
472 (Colo. 1934) (Colorado authority for affirming a lower court decision when ap-
pellate court is equally divided on the issues).
256. barra v. Duc Van Le, 114 S. Ct. 918 (1994).
257. See supra note 14 and cases cited therein.
258. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,259 the Court
held that the mentally retarded, a sub-group of the larger class
of persons with disabilities, do not constitute a quasi-suspect
class. 260 The Court reasoned that the mentally retarded differ
from other persons because of their reduced ability to cope with
and function in the everyday world.261 The Court opined that
because of these unique characteristics, the state's interest in
dealing with and providing for the mentally retarded as a sepa-
rate class is plainly a legitimate one.26 2 The Court went on to
conclude that how the mentally retarded, a large and diversified
group, are to be treated under the law is a difficult and often
technical matter that goes beyond judicial "substantive judg-
ments about legislative decisions," and is very much a task for
legislators guided by qualified professionals and not by the per-
haps ill-informed opinions of the judiciary. 263 If the Court had
given the mentally retarded suspect or quasi-suspect class sta-
tus, it would automatically have put itself in the position of
heavily scrutinizing and, therefore, second guessing, what it
deemed to be the legislature's much more informed decisions.
The Court also reasoned that since the mentally retarded
have been the subject of considerable state and federal legisla-
tion addressing their difficulties "in a manner that belies a con-
tinuing antipathy or prejudice," the need for more intrusive
oversight by the judiciary does not exist.26 The Court then
stated that "[t]he legislative response, which could hardly have
occurred and survived without public support, negates any
claim that the mentally retarded are politically powerless in the
sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of the
lawmakers."265 Finally, in what has become much quoted dic-
tum, the Court stated:
if the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were
deemed quasi-suspect.., it would be difficult to distinguish a va-
riety of other groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities
setting them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the
259. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
260. Id. at 435, 442.
261. Id. at 442-43.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 443.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 445.
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desired legislative responses, and who can claim some degree of
prejudice from at least part of the public at large. One need men-
tion in this respect only the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill,
and the infirm. We are reluctant to set out on that course, and we
decline to do so. 266
Numerous courts concerned with opening the floodgates of liti-
gation have used that language to hold that the disabled are not
a suspect or quasi-suspect class.267 Furthermore, since
Cleburne, the Supreme Court has not issued a single decision
which adds to the already existing suspect class categories.268
B. Criticism of Cleburne
The majority decision in Cleburne has been widely criti-
cized, by the dissenters at the time it was decided 269 and, subse-
quently, by legal scholars. 270 Most of the criticism has focused
on the reasoning the Court gave for refusing to provide quasi-
suspect or suspect class status to persons with disabilities. 271
However, some of the criticism has taken issue with the Court's
266. Id. at 445-46 (emphasis added).
267. See, e.g., Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661, 671 (11th Cir. 1990) ("Cleburne
* . . clearly indicates that legislation affecting persons suffering from a physical
handicap ... is to be judged, in the face of an equal protection challenge, in terms
of the rationally related, and not a higher standard."); Pendleton v. Jefferson Local
School District, 754 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (following Cleburne and Lussier
in holding that the disabled are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class and, therefore,
are only subject to the rational basis standard); American Veterans v. United
States Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 962 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying the
rational basis standard to legislation denying disability benefits to certain men-
tally incompetent disabled veterans); Story v. Green, 978 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1992)
(noting that disability has not generally been considered a suspect or quasi-suspect
classification under the Equal Protection Clause).
268. Neil D. O'Toole, The ADA: Strict Scrutiny For Disabled Workers, 21
COLO. LAW. 733, 734 (1992).
269. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 455-78 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan &
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
270. See Rains, supra note 50, at 198-99 nn. 85-88 (criticizing many aspects of
the Cleburne decision); see also TRIBE, supra note 27, § 16-3, at 1444-46; Martha
Minow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded,
Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
111, 116 (1987).
271. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 455-78 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, and
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Rains, supra
note 50, at 198-99 nn. 85-88.
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failure to admit that it performed a higher degree of scrutiny
than what it claimed it was using-rational basis.272
The Court in Cleburne placed considerable weight on the
fact that there was a distinctive legislative response to the
plight of the mentally retarded.273 It, therefore, concluded that
more intrusive oversight by the judiciary was unnecessary
when faced with a classification based on the mentally re-
tarded.274 The Court appeared to be using the so-called "polit-
ical processes" argument found in Justice Stone's renowned
Carolene Products footnote,27 5 where he stated:
Legislation which restricts those political processes which can or-
dinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legisla-
tion, [may] be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under
the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are
most other types of legislation.. . [and] prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordi-
narily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.276
Strict scrutiny, which Justice Stone advocated for discrete
and insular minorities, 27 7 places a considerable amount of
power in the judiciary, allowing it to intrude into the political
process and examine whether it is working properly. 278 Thus,
such a level of scrutiny is normally used only for groups in our
society that have faced persistent prejudice and have been rele-
272. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part). "The Court holds the ordinance invalid on rational-
basis grounds and disclaims that anything special, in the form of heightened scru-
tiny, is taking place. Yet Cleburne's ordinance surely would be valid under the
traditional rational-basis test applicable to economic and commercial regulation."
Id.; see also TRIBE, supra note 27, § 16-3, at 1444-45; Minow, supra note 270, at
116 (stating that the Cleburne majority "actually offered a beefed up version" of the
rational basis test).
273. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 443.
274. Id.
275. See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see
also supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
276. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
277. Id.
278. See TRIBE, supra note 27, § 16-6, at 1451-54 (explaining strict scrutiny
and its degree of intrusion into the legislative province).
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gated to an inferior societal position.29 In contrast, the
Cleburne Court suggested that when the legislature gives atten-
tion to a specific group by enacting legislation designed to im-
prove that group's status, strict scrutiny is not needed and
should not be applied.280 The Cleburne Court's reasoning, how-
ever, is flawed because this formulation would work to the dis-
advantage of groups in our society. Once the legislature
succeeds in its efforts to provide protective legislation for a par-
ticular group, that group would then be in danger of receiving
less judicial protection.2s8 For example, if the Cleburne Court's
reasoning was followed, African Americans and women would
lose their special judicial protection solely because they have
gained the attention of the legislature. Major federal civil
rights statutes, as well as constitutional amendments, have
been enacted to enhance the status of African Americans and
women in our society;28 2 yet, they properly continue to be
viewed as suspect and quasi-suspect classes, respectively.2 3
The branches of government should share the function of pro-
tecting disadvantaged groups in our society, not rescind their
effort once another branch has contributed to those protections.
Since Cleburne, the ADA has been passed. Its passage may
be viewed as only broadening the Cleburne Court's conclusion:
that the disabled are getting enough legislative attention and,
therefore, do not need special protected class status. The
Supreme Court would likely argue that the enactment of the
279. See TRIBE, supra note 27, § 16-6, at 1453-54; San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (noting that strict scrutiny is used for
suspect classes, which have been subject to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection).
280. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 443 (commenting that the distinctive legisla-
tive response afforded to the mentally retarded demonstrates that the lawmakers
have been addressing their problems and obviates the need for strict scrutiny).
281. See TRIBE, supra note 27, § 16-31, at 1593-94 n.18.
282. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV (enacted to aid African
Americans in attaining equal status in society after the Civil War); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIX (granting women the right to vote); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000a-1 to -6, 2000e-1 to -17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting discrimination
in public accommodations and employment on the basis of race, color, creed, na-
tional origin, or sex) (emphasis added).
283. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (treating race as a suspect
class); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (treating gender
as a quasi-suspect class).
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ADA serves as prima facie evidence that the plight of the dis-
abled is being addressed by our country's lawmakers. Again,
however, this argument is weak because the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and numerous constitutional amendments284 primarily ad-
dress discrimination against African Americans and, neverthe-
less, the Court properly treats race as a suspect class.3 5
C. Congress' Attempt to Statutorily Impose a Standard of
Judicial Review
By adopting the ADA, Congress apparently attempted to
utilize the Carolene Products discrete and insular minority the-
ory2 6 to imply that a heightened level of scrutiny should be
used in disability discrimination cases.287 Some courts have
suggested that heightened scrutiny should be used2 because
Congress welcomed this interpretation by its choice of language
used to describe the disabled in the ADA findings:
[I]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority
faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of polit-
ical powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are
beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereo-
typic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of
such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society.
289
This language echoes the precise language used consistently by
the Court to describe a suspect class.2 90 In addition, the Court
has used the phrase "discrete and insular minority" when ad-
284. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV; Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a-1 to -6, 2000e-1 to -17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
285. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (applying strict scrutiny to
statutory scheme preventing mixed-race marriages); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S.
429 (1984) (applying strict scrutiny to child custody award based on perceived ra-
cial discrimination due to mixed-race parents).
286. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
287. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (finding that individuals with disabilities are
a "discrete and insular minority").
288. See, e.g., Trautz v. Weisman, 819 F. Supp. 282, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Peo-
ple v. Green, 148 Misc. 2d 666, 669, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130, 132 (Westchester County
Ct. 1990) (both suggesting a heightened level of scrutiny should be used by the
courts when faced with a disability discrimination claim).
289. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (emphasis added).
290. See, e.g., San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)
(stating that a suspect class is one "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of
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ding a new classification to the list of suspect categories. 291
Therefore, it is not surprising that courts have used the ADA's
description of persons with disabilities as evidence that Con-
gress' intent was to transform the disabled into a suspect class
for purposes of constitutional and statutory interpretation, and
to put the disabled on equal grounds with other protected
classes in our society.292 Congress may have been trying to
broaden the constitutional guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment by its description of persons with disabilities in the
ADA and, thus, "force" courts into holding that the disabled con-
stitute a protected class for purposes of constitutional and stat-
utory interpretation. In addition, the ADA is essentially
Congress' stamp of approval on the lower court's analysis in
Cleburne, which held persons with disabilities to be a quasi-sus-
pect class.293
The ADA was passed under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which grants Congress the power to enact legisla-
tion to "enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the
Fourteenth Amendment]."294 As stated earlier, the Court has
allowed Congress to expand constitutional guarantees under
the Fourteenth Amendment through its use of Section Five,
even when the Court itself has not defined the right at issue as
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian process").
291. The elements of "discreteness and insularity" have been relied upon
mostly in recognizing aliens to be a suspect class. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467
U.S. 216, 220 (1984) (using "discrete and insular minority" to describe aliens as a
suspect class); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (discussing how
aliens are a perfect example of a "discrete and insular minority"). Racial and eth-
nic classifications, however, are subject to stringent examination without regard to
these additional characteristics, and the rationale of discrete and insular minority
has never been invoked by the Court as a prerequisite to subjecting racial and
ethnic distinctions to strict scrutiny. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978).
292. See Trautz v. Weisman, 819 F. Supp. 282, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing
Congress' language in 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) describing the disabled as a discrete
and insular minority with a history of purposeful unequal treatment); see also
Chatoff v. City of New York, No. 92 Civ. 0604, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21662, at *1
(S.D.N.Y June 26, 1992) (quoting a congressional statement identifying the dis-
abled as a discrete and insular minority).
293. Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984);
see also O'Toole, supra note 268, at 734.
294. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. For the full text of Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see supra note 24.
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guaranteed under the Equal Protection Clause.295 Some Jus-
tices have disagreed with this approach, stating that Congress
simply has no authority to legislate until and unless the
Supreme Court first guarantees a right.296 Some may view the
Court's deference to congressional determinations as a threat to
the fundamental principle set forth in Marbury v. Madison297
that "[it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is."298 However, it is not diffi-
cult to harmonize Marbury with the Ratchet Theory of Katzen-
bach v. Morgan.299
Under Marbury, the Court devised the power of judicial re-
view to strike down acts of Congress which it finds repugnant to
the Constitution.300 In defining the power of judicial review, the
Court has stated: "Marbury v. Madison... declared the basic
principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition
of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since
been respected by this Court and the country as a permanent
and indispensable feature of our constitutional system."301 As
such, Marbury has been recognized as granting the Supreme
Court the authority to be the ultimate interpreter of the Consti-
tution-the last word. However, Marbury does not stand for
the proposition that the Court is the only interpreter of the Con-
stitution. In other words, "being 'ultimate interpreter'.., is not
295. See supra notes 33-53 and accompanying text.
296. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 260 (1983) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
297. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 146-80 (1803).
298. Id. at 177.
299. 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966). See Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan
"Power" and the Forced Reconsiderations of Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 819, 824 (1986) (arguing that Morgan is "best understood as a tool that per-
mits the Congress to use its power to enact ordinary legislation to engage the
Court in a dialogue about our fundamental rights, thereby 'forcing' the Justices to
take a fresh look at their own judgments"); William Cohen, Congressional Power to
Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REv. 603, 610-12 (1975)
(arguing that Morgan follows the general proposition that the courts will not limit
congressional power based on concepts of federalism because the political con-
straints on Congress are sufficient to protect against imprudent congressional ac-
tion). See also supra notes 40-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Morgan case and the Ratchet Theory.
300. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For a learned discus-
sion of the Marbury decision and the power of judicial review, see TRIBE, supra
note 27, § 3-2.
301. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
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the same as being exclusive interpreter."3 0 2 As one famous con-
stitutional scholar notes:
Judicial review does not require that the Constitution always be
equated with the Supreme Court's view of it. It is the Court's re-
sponsibility, under Marbury, to strike down acts of Congress
which the Court concludes to be unconstitutional-nothing more.
Marbury implies nothing about the criteria by which the Court
should determine whether an act of Congress is unconstitutional;
it requires only that such criteria should exist.303
Accordingly, Congress can establish statutory rights in areas
not yet recognized by the Court when it has the authority under
its constitutionally enumerated powers and is not prohibited by
another constitutional provision.30 4
Congress passed the ADA pursuant to Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment-a congressionally enumerated power
of the Constitution.3 05 The ADA serves to expand constitutional
rights of the disabled, not to diminish them. This expansion
helps to ensure that the disabled receive equal protection of the
laws, and places individuals with disabilities on equal footing
with other protected classes.30 As a result, the ADA constitu-
tionally expands the rights previously guaranteed to persons
with disabilities under the Fourteenth Amendment to help en-
sure that their rights are similar to the rights of other citi-
zens.307 By enacting the ADA, Congress has shared the
responsibility of defining and protecting individual's rights
under the Equal Protection Clause with the judiciary. The
question remains, however, whether the Court will fully effectu-
302. Louis Fischer, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63
N.C. L. REv. 707, 715 (1985) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)).
303. See TRIBE, supra note 27, § 5-14, at 349.
304. See Pawa supra note 33, at 1100 (citing The Freedom of Choice Act of
1991: Hearings on H.R. 25 Before the House Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights, 102 Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (statements of Professor Laurence H. Tribe)); see
also Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651; supra notes 40-53 and accompanying text.
305. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. For the full text of Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see supra note 24.
306. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (findings and purposes of the ADA).
307. See Penn Lerblance, Introducing the Americans With Disabilities Act:
Promises and Challenges, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 149 (1992) (stating that the ADA gives
protections to the forty-three million Americans with disabilities that are similar
to those provided to individuals subjected to racial, sexual, or religious
discrimination).
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ate Congress' intent or preference that the disabled be given
this higher status in equal protection cases.308 Since Congress
did not explicitly mandate in the ADA that the disabled should
be transformed into a suspect class or expressly state what
standard of review the Court should use when faced with future
classifications based on disability, Congress has left the ulti-
mate decision to the Court's discretion.
Congress has often legislated under its Section Five power
to outlaw discrimination before the Court has accepted a partic-
ular class as protected.30 9 Congress has previously enacted leg-
islation, leaving an area of equal protection open for the Court's
subsequent approval; most notably in the areas of gender and
age discrimination. 310
For example, before the Court held gender to be a quasi-
suspect class, rational basis review was used in gender discrimi-
nation cases, albeit with a sharper focus. 3 11 Before the Supreme
Court elevated the status of gender to that of a quasi-suspect
class, Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,312 under its Section Five power, extending Title VII's cov-
erage to the states. 313 Subsequent to the amendments, the
308. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2)-(3) (stating that it is the purpose of the ADA
to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimina-
tion against individuals with disabilities... [and] to ensure that the Federal Gov-
ernment plays a central role in enforcing those standards...").
309. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-1 to -6, 2000e-1 to -
17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (outlawing discrimination on the basis of gender even
though the Court had not embraced gender as a protected class for equal protec-
tion purposes); see also Pawa, supra note 33, for examples of Congress legislating
in areas not yet given special status by the Supreme Court.
310. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988
& Supp. V 1993) (federal legislation outlawing age discrimination in employment);
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-1 to -6, 2000e-1 to -17 (1988 & Supp. V
1993) (federal legislation outlawing gender discrimination in public accommoda-
tions and employment).
311. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17 (1975); Weinberger v. Wie-
senfeld, 420 U.S. 636.(1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (all stating that they were using the rational basis stan-
dard to review gender discrimination claims, while actually applying a stricter
form of scrutiny more in line with heightened scrutiny); see also Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 210 n.* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[C]andor compels the recog-
nition that the relatively deferential 'rational basis' standard of review normally
applied takes on a sharper focus when we address a gender-based classification.").
312. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)
(1988)).
313. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453 n.9 (1976).
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Court reviewed a gender discrimination case, Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer,3 14 where it upheld Congress' use of Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment in enacting the amendments to Title
VII.315 Then, approximately six months later, the Court held
gender to be a protected class for purposes of equal protection
review in Craig v. Boren.316 Consequently, Congress prohibited
gender discrimination using its power under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment before the Court embraced gender as a
quasi-suspect class. The Court not only allowed Congress to do
so, but subsequently, in Fitzpatrick changed its own standard of
review in gender cases, elevating gender to the level of a pro-
tected class in Craig, thus, placing its imprimatur on Congress'
action. The Court, therefore, has used congressional legislation
on occasion to guide its decisions. As Justice Marshall stated in
his Cleburne dissent:
It is natural that evolving standards of equality come to be em-
bodied in legislation. When that occurs, courts should look to the
fact of such change as a source of guidance .... [T]he Court
reached this very conclusion when it extended heightened scru-
tiny to gender classifications and drew on parallel legislative de-
velopments to support that extension .... 317
In addition, the Court in Frontiero v. Richardson stated that
when Congress, as a co-equal branch of government, concludes
that a classification is inherently invidious, that finding is not
without significance.31 8
There are other examples of Congress legislating to protect
classes where the Court had not yet defined that particular
class as worthy of protected class status under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) was first passed in 1967, and subsequently amended
314. Id.
315. Id. at 456.
316. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
317. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 466-67 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, & Black-
mun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
318. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687 (1973) (plurality opinion)
(holding that gender is a class worthy of middle level scrutiny). A majority of the
Court has since held that gender is a well-established middle-tier class under the
Equal Protection Clause. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
724 (1982).
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throughout the next three decades.319 However, the Court has
never held age to be a protected class. The Court has consist-
ently examined classifications based on age under the rational
basis standard, refusing to accord age suspect class status. 320
Therefore, simply because Congress has seen fit to pass legisla-
tion to improve the status of a particular class has not inevita-
bly led the Court to change its previous position, or to adopt a
new position it had not previously embraced. Hence, it appears
that both Congress and the Court have been advancing equal
protection rights while influencing each other to a significant
extent.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)321 was spe-
cifically designed to overturn a prior Supreme Court decision,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith,3 22 in which the Court
held that the government may prohibit religious conduct within
religion-neutral legislation without showing a compelling inter-
est for doing so. 323 In other words, the Court refused to use
strict scrutiny when examining legislation based on religious
freedom. The RFRA prohibits a government from restricting
religious freedom unless it can show a compelling governmental
interest.324 In effect, the RFRA represents Congress' attempt to
legislatively overrule the Court's previous decision in Smith
and mandate strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court has not yet
reviewed this recently enacted statute.3 25 It, therefore, remains
unclear whether the Court will give effect to the distinct con-
gressional intent embodied in the RFRA and overturn the
Smith decision. However, the RFRA serves as a powerful exam-
ple of Congress' ability to legislate under Section Five of the
319. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967), amended in 1974 by Pub. L. No.
93-259, 88 Stat. 74, amended in 1978 by Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189, amended
in 1986 by Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100 Stat. 3342, amended in 1989 by Pub. L. No. 101-
239, 103 Stat. 2233, amended in 1990 by Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
320. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 109-12 (1979) (upholding a re-
tirement provision under the rational basis standard); Massachusetts Bd. of Re-
tirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-14 (1976) (holding that age discrimination
need only pass the rational basis, rather than strict scrutiny standard).
321. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 to -4 (Supp. V 1993).
322. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
323. Id. at 886 n.3.
324. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
325. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).
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Fourteenth Amendment and expand constitutional rights, even
when the Court has previously refused to recognize them.
The ADEA, the RFRA, and the amendments to Title VII all
demonstrate that Congress has the authority to legislate in ar-
eas not yet defined by the Court as protected for purposes of
equal protection. Congress was using this expansive authority
when it enacted the ADA. However, Congress did not phrase its
findings in such explicit language as it did in the RFRA.326 On
the other hand, the ADA's language was more persuasive and
expansive than the ADEA, which limited its purpose to prohib-
iting age discrimination only in employment. 327 Congress ex-
pressly stated that the purpose of the ADA is "to provide clear,
strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimi-
nation against individuals with disabilities... [and] to ensure
that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing
the standards established in this [statute] on behalf of individu-
als with disabilities."328 Of course, the federal judiciary is part
of the federal government, and, as a result, must enforce Con-
gress' mandate that the federal government play a central role
in enforcing the ADA.
In the ADA, Congress stated that people with disabilities
have often had "no legal recourse to redress such discrimina-
tion,"329 recognizing the courts' ineffective treatment of the dis-
abled in the past.330 Most importantly, however, is the
326. Compare the RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 to -4 (stating as its purpose "to
restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner . . . and
Wisconsin v. Yoder . .. and to guarantee its application in all cases where free
exercise of religion is substantially burdened) (citations omitted) with the ADA, 42
U.S.C. § 12101(a) (devoid of any explicit language mandating a particular test or
standard to be used when faced with an equal protection challenge based on
disability).
327. Compare the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (stating as its purpose "to pro-
mote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to pro-
hibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers
find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment")
with the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (stating that the purpose of the ADA is to
address the major areas of discrimination faced daily by persons with disabili-
ties-not just employment).
328. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(2).
329. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4).
330. See, e.g., California Ass'n of the Physically Handicapped v. FCC, 721
F.2d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1983) (refusing to hold that disabled individuals are a sus-
pect class); Brown v. Sibley, 650 F.2d 760, 766 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that dis-
abled individuals are not a suspect class); Upshur v. Love, 474 F. Supp. 332, 337
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language used in the ADA to describe persons with disabilities
as a class-"a discrete and insular minority... subjected to a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a po-
sition of political powerlessness in our society... ."331 Congress
was apparently using the Carolene Products formulation to
mandate a heightened level of judicial scrutiny in cases of dis-
crimination based on disability.332
The Supreme Court denied certiorari to the only case prop-
erly requesting review of the issue of whether the disabled con-
stitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class, Ibarra v. Duc Van
Le33 3-thereby leaving the issue unresolved. The vagueness of
the congressional language in the ADA has left the issue ob-
scure enough that courts have fallen on both sides of the issue:
some finding that a protected class has been created,33 some
not.33 5 This split in judicial decisions336 will inevitably widen
and force the Court to decide the issue.
(N.D. Cal. 1979) (commenting that physical handicap is more analogous to age
than race and, therefore, evokes only the rational basis standard).
331. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(7); see also supra text accompanying note 289 for
the full congressional description of individuals with disabilities as a class.
332. See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see
also supra text accompanying note 276 for the content of the Carolene Prods.
footnote.
333. 114 S. Ct. 918 (1994) (denying writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of
Colorado); see supra part III.B.2.c for a discussion of Duc Van Le; see also Heller v.
Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642 (refusing to address whether the disabled constitute a
quasi-suspect class based on the failure to raise the issue in any of the lower
courts).
334. See, e.g., Trautz v. Weisman, 819 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); People v.
Green, 148 Misc. 2d 666, 669, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130, 132 (Westchester County Ct.
1990).
335. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990 (3d Cir. 1993);
More v. Farrier, 984 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1993); Tomsha v. City of Colorado Springs,
856 P.2d 13 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
336. The few courts that have reached the issue demonstrate the inconsis-
tency of judicial opinion regarding the status of the disabled in light of the ADA's
enactment. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990 (3d Cir. 1993)
(refusing to apply heightened scrutiny to a classification based on disability even
after the ADA's enactment); More v. Farrier, 984 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating
that the ADA does not alter the standard for constitutional equal protection
claims); Trautz v. Weisman, 819 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding the dis-
abled to be a protected class under federal conspiracy statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3),
relying on the ADA); Duc Van Le v. Ibarra, No. 91SC189, 1992 WL 77908 (Colo.
Apr. 20, 1992) (using both strict scrutiny and rational basis review to determine
that the state had violated the equal protection rights of the disabled); Tomsha v.
City of Colorado Springs, 856 P.2d 13 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting a claim that
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A review of the decisions refusing to hold that the disabled
are a suspect class reveals that some courts have based their
refusal either on the effective date of the ADA or that the partic-
ular claim was not brought under the ADA.33 7 Moreover, these
decisions do not provide any insight into how the courts would
have held if the ADA had been in effect.338 These decisions,
therefore, do not provide a strong argument for refusing to
grant persons with disabilities special judicial protection.33 9
Thus, having no guidance from the Supreme Court as to
whether the disabled now constitute a suspect class since the
passage of the ADA, lower courts have relied upon Cleburne as
authority. These courts have used the rational basis standard
of review enunciated in Cleburne, refusing to confer suspect
class status on the disabled. 340 Therefore, if the Supreme Court
overturned Cleburne, then the lower courts would be forced to
change their position.
D. Predictions of the Supreme Court's Ultimate Decision
In predicting whether the Supreme Court necessarily will
decide that the disabled are now a suspect class, several argu-
the disabled are a suspect class, solely because the ADA was not yet in effect);
People v. Green, 148 Misc. 2d 666, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130 (Westchester County Ct.
1990) (noting in dicta that persons with disabilities should be treated as a suspect
class for equal protection review); see also supra part III.B and notes 177-256 for
an examination of these decisions involving the question of whether the disabled
now constitute a quasi-suspect or suspect class for purposes of constitutional and
statutory interpretation.
337. See supra part III.B.2.a and part III.B.2.c for a discussion of the Tomsha
and Duc Van Le cases, which were decisions based on timing, as opposed to the
merits.
338. See, e.g., Tomsha, 856 P.2d at 14 (failing to comment how the court would
have decided the case if the ADA had been in effect).
339. See, e.g., id. at 14 (summarily dismissing the argument that the disabled
plaintiff should be given suspect class status solely because the ADA was not in
effect at the time of plaintiff's injury).
340. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1001 (3d Cir.
1993) (relying on Cleburne as authority to apply rational basis review to a classifi-
cation based on disability and to reject application of heightened scrutiny); Lussier
v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661, 671 (11th Cir. 1990) ("Cleburne... clearly indicates that
legislation affecting persons suffering from a physical handicap.., is to be judged,
in the face of an equal protection challenge, in terms of the 'rationally related', and
not a higher, standard."); Pendleton v. Jefferson Local Sch. Dist., 754 F. Supp. 570,
578 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (following Cleburne and Lussier in holding that the disabled
are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class and, therefore, are only subject to the ra-
tional basis standard).
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ments must be considered. For example, the conservatism of
the present Court,341 as compared with the Cleburne Court, de-
creases the likelihood that it will expand the protections of the
Equal Protection Clause to the extreme of granting suspect
class status to individuals with disabilities. 342 Rather, it will
more likely uphold Cleburne, leaving the disabled at the lowest
level of scrutiny, or at the most, hold them to be a quasi-suspect
class.
3 4 3
Another argument to be considered is that Congress passed
the ADA to aid the disabled in attaining equality in society.3 "
This may influence the Court into believing that the system is
working, and that strict exacting scrutiny is not necessary to
protect a group that inspires so much political attention, and is
obviously using the political process to its advantage. 345 How-
ever, this argument is untenable considering that other classes,
such as race and gender, have certainly gained the attention of
the political process, yet are still entitled to the special protec-
tion of the courts. 34
341. The present Court can be considered more "conservative" than the
Cleburne Court, since Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, three of the
great liberals, have stepped down. See Joan Biskupic, New Justices May Shift
Supreme Court Balance on Pending Racial Issues, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1995, at Al
(stating that the high Court has seen the retirements of the "most articulate and
eloquent voices on behalf of equal protection and equal rights"-Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun). In addition, the two new Justices named by President
Clinton-Justices Breyer and Ginsberg-are cautious thinkers who prefer to leave
difficult social questions to elected officials and, therefore, will not significantly tip
the balance of the present Court. See Ana Puga, Top Court Stays a Cautious
Course, Observers Say, BOSTON GLOBE, May 23, 1994, at 1 (discussing the current
Court's attitude ofjudicial restraint and cautiousness demonstrating a tendency to
avoid dramatic pronouncements as much as possible).
342. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642 (1993) (refusing to address
the issue of whether a distinction based on mental retardation should be given
heightened scrutiny solely because the issue was not presented to any of the lower
courts, thus evidencing the current Court's reluctance to even address the issue).
343. See infra part 1V.E for a discussion of quasi-suspect class status as the
best solution for persons with disabilities.
344. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(8) (stating that the nation's proper goals re-
garding individuals with disabilities are to "assure equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such
individuals").
345. See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
(suggesting that when the political process is working, strict exacting scrutiny is
unnecessary).
346. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 201-716, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to d-4,
2000e to e-15, 2000g to h6 (1988) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race,
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In addition, if the Supreme Court overturns Cleburne based
on the congressional findings and purposes language of the
ADA, 347 it may be surmised that the legislative branch has en-
croached on the judiciary's authority.348 However, the Court
often relies on the congressional findings and purposes lan-
guage of a statute as a guide to reinterpreting past decisions.3 49
On the other hand, the Court may be reluctant to hold that the
disabled are a suspect class simply because Congress has essen-
tially labeled them as such.
In the lower courts, ultimately, the question will become
whether judicial restraint 350 or judicial activism 3 5 ' is appropri-
ate. If a court interprets its responsibility as following the will
of the people as expressed by the elected officials of Congress,
then it may hold that the disabled are a suspect class, and re-
frain from interfering with the implicit intent of Congress.352
Alternatively, if a court takes the position that it is uniquely the
judiciary's responsibility to impose a standard of review on a
particular class, and not the responsibility of the legislature, it
may refuse to afford persons with disabilities suspect class sta-
color, creed, national origin, or sex) (emphasis added); see also supra notes 282-83
and accompanying text; Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982) (intermediate scrutiny for gender); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(strict scrutiny for race).
347. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (stating that the disabled are a discrete and insu-
lar minority with a history of purposeful unequal treatment).
348. See infra notes 350-55 and accompanying text, discussing the theories of
judicial restraint and judicial activism and their relation to the separation of pow-
ers between the judicial and legislative branches.
349. See supra notes 309-25 and accompanying text for examples of the Court
relying on congressional legislation to reinterpret past decisions.
350. "Judicial self-restraint" is defined as a "[slelf-imposed discipline by
judges in deciding cases without permitting themselves to indulge their own per-
sonal views or ideas which may be inconsistent with existing decisional or statu-
tory law." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONAaY 849 (6th ed. 1990).
351. "Judicial activism" is defined as
a [jiudicial philosophy which motivates judges to depart from strict adher-
ence to judicial precedent in favor of progressive and new social policies
which are not always consistent with the restraint expected of appellate
judges. It is commonly marked by decisions calling for social engineering
and occasionally these decisions represent intrusions into legislative and ex-
ecutive matter.
BLAC's LAw DICTIONARY 847 (6th ed. 1990).
352. See ALcE FLEETWOOD BARTEE, CASES LOST, CAUSES WON 104 (1984)
(stating that judicial restraint is the belief that the Court should not interfere with
Congress).
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tus. Accordingly, the exchange of ideas between the legislative
and judicial branches will play an integral part in how this is-
sue is ultimately resolved. There is a strong argument for heed-
ing the mandate of Congress-the elected officials in a
democratic society.353 Congress has better fact-finding abilities
than the Supreme Court-it may hold hearings, conduct stud-
ies, and subpoena witnesses, as it often does. 354 One can argue
that this enables Congress to be more in touch with the views of
the general public and, in turn, be better equipped at meeting
the needs and wishes of society as a whole through its
legislation. 355
Nevertheless, only the Supreme Court itself can properly
answer this question.356 The Court may choose to treat the dis-
abled as it did gender, and allow Congress to effectively define
the guarantees afforded that group under the Equal Protection
Clause, and then subsequently place its approval on Congress'
action by raising the standard of review afforded to persons
353. See, e.g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing
that "democratic institutions are weakened, and confidence in the restraint of the
Court is impaired, when [the Court] appear[s] unnecessarily to decide sensitive
issues of broad social and political importance at the very time they are under
consideration within the prescribed constitutional processes"); see also TRIBE,
supra note 27, § 16-6, at 1451 (stating that there is a case to be made for a signifi-
cant degree of judicial deference to legislative choices).
354. See Pawa, supra note 33, at 1067-68, for a discussion of Congress' broad
fact-finding abilities. The Supreme Court has frequently commented on its lack of
an equivalent fact-finding capability. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
249 n.31 (1970) (essentially contending that the Court should defer to congres-
sional choices over the Court's own interpretations when Congress is able to
"unearth new evidence in its investigation").
355. See, e.g., Pawa, supra note 33, at 1067 (arguing that "Congress is a more
appropriate institution for investigating widespread social problems such as racial,
gender, and religious inequality, and for devising solutions to those problems"); see
also Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 206-07 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stressing that the deci-
sions Congress makes based upon its factual investigations are moral in dimension
and that judgments of that sort are beyond the institutional competence and con-
stitutional authority of the judiciary).
356. Cf Pawa, supra note 33, at 1072 n.276 (citing The Freedom of Choice Act
of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 25 Before the House Subcomm. on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (statements of Professor Laurence H.
Tribe) ("Congress may not legislatively 'create' constitutional rights as a means of
circumventing the authority of the Supreme Court as final expositor of the mean-
ing of the Constitution."))
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with disabilities in a later decision. 357 Conversely, the Court
may treat the disabled as it did age discrimination, and refuse
to change its prior stance even after Congress has enacted legis-
lation enlarging the protections afforded that class under the
Equal Protection Clause.5 8 If the Court does hold the disabled
to be a suspect or quasi-suspect class, then Congress will have
effectively expanded the rights of persons with disabilities
under the Equal Protection Clause by its actions and, thus,
"forced" the Court to take a fresh look at its own decisions. 359
E. Quasi-Suspect Class Status for Persons With Disabilities
As the Best Solution
The argument for holding that the disabled are a suspect
class is based on the notion that if the disabled were so deemed,
they would be given the ultimate level of protection by the
courts.3 60 If persons with disabilities were given suspect class
status, governments would not be capable of enacting legisla-
tion that classifies based on disability absent a compelling gov-
ernmental interest.361 However, establishing a bright-line rule
that all statutes classifying based on disability are to be strictly
scrutinized may harm the disabled more than it would help
them because benign, remedial statutes designed to aid the dis-
abled,362 when strictly scrutinized, may be struck down. This
may be especially true with statutes or governmental action
357. See supra notes 309-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
the Court raised the status of gender after Congress passed legislation granting
women more protection.
358. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
See supra notes 321-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the Court
failed to raise the status of age even after Congress passed special legislation pro-
tecting that classification.
359. See Carter, supra note 299, at 824 (arguing that Congress can use its
Section Five power to engage the Court in a dialogue and "force" the Court to take
a fresh look at its own judgments).
360. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(noting that suspect class status warrants strict exacting scrutiny by the courts,
which is the highest level of protection given by the courts in equal protection
cases).
361. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).
362. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-220 (Michie 1991) (benign, remedial
statute ensuring appropriate commitment and treatment of the mentally ill).
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meant to aid the mentally retarded and the mentally ill, a group
with special characteristics, as the Court has already noted.363
If the disabled were to be deemed a quasi-suspect class,
however, they would still be given more protection by the courts
than if they were left with no special status at all.364 Accord-
ingly, some scholars believe that the Supreme Court's opinion
in Cleburne was too harsh in failing to grant the disabled even
quasi-suspect status, when the Cleburne Court actually em-
ployed heightened scrutiny sub silentio.3 65 If the Court accorded
the disabled quasi-suspect class status, then statutes classify-
ing based on disability would be placed on the same par with
gender and illegitimacy, 366 rather than being left at the lowest
level of review along with economic legislation.3 67 Additionally,
quasi-suspect class status for the disabled would prevent courts
from striking down remedial legislation in a similar manner as
with gender. 36 8 Such a standard could provide the courts with
enough scrutiny to protect against suspicious legislation that is
discriminatory in its application, while at the same time up-
holding remedial legislation that classifies based on real differ-
ences between a disabled group and the general population.3 69
363. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442 (referring to the unique characteristics of
the mentally retarded and the state's interest in dealing with and providing for
them separately); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-220 (Michie 1991) (dealing with
commitment and treatment of the mentally ill).
364. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)
(protecting gender as a quasi-suspect class); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
(protecting gender as a quasi-suspect class); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495
(1976) (protecting illegitimacy as a quasi-suspect class).
365. See, e.g., TRiBE, supra note 27, § 16-3, at 1444-45; Minow, supra note
272, at 116.
366. See, e.g., Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (protecting gender as a quasi-sus-
pect class); Craig, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (protecting gender as a quasi-suspect class);
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (protecting illegitimacy as a quasi-suspect
class).
367. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding an eco-
nomic regulation of the Maryland Department of Public Welfare under the rational
basis standard).
368. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975); Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353-54 (1974) (both upholding remedial legislation designed
to redress past disadvantageous conditions faced by women in military and eco-
nomic life).
369. Cf ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-220 (Michie 1991) (classifying based on
mental disability, but distinguishing between the mentally ill and the general pop-
ulation based on benign, remedial purpose of ensuring appropriate commitment
and treatment of the mentally ill).
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The Court has never provided a direct explanation of what
characteristics trigger heightened scrutiny. However, it has
noted certain factors that it has used to determine whether a
particular group is eligible for quasi-suspect status. For exam-
ple, personal immutability, the inability to change a personal
characteristic or trait, has been used by the Court as a factor in
determining quasi-suspect status.370 As the Trautz court noted,
"a disability by its very nature is an immutable obstacle often
created only by an accident of birth, not unlike race, gender, or
national origin, which cannot be erased, but must be sur-
mounted."371 Frequently, the cause of a disability is outside the
control of the individual, and the disability itself has no bearing
on that individual's capability to participate in society.372 How-
ever, there may be circumstances where a disability is relevant
to an individual's performance in society,3 73 but heightened
scrutiny allows some latitude on the part of the government
adopting the legislation to account for that type of situation.
Under heightened scrutiny, if the government has an important
interest and the classification based on the disability is substan-
tially related to that important governmental interest, the legis-
lation would be allowed to stand.374 Therefore, heightened
scrutiny would allow the Court to examine the governmental
action, keeping in mind that the disabled may have some real
differences, both physically and intellectually, that may be rele-
vant to particular legislation or governmental activity. 375
370. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (holding sex is
an immutable characteristic and classifications based on gender are inherently in-
vidious); Webster v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 176 (1972) (sug-
gesting that heightened scrutiny is triggered by invidious discrimination based on
"status of birth"); see also Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (arguing that suspect class status should be found only where
the status of an individual cannot be altered and that alienage is, therefore, not a
suspect class). It is interesting to note that in Cleburne, no Justice questioned the
fact that mental retardation is an immutable trait, yet the Court still found that
the mentally retarded were not a quasi-suspect class. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442.
371. Trautz v. Weisman, 819 F. Supp. 282, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
372. For example, disfiguring birth defects are outside the control of the indi-
vidual and may not interfere with that individual's capacity to adequately partici-
pate in society.
373. Most notably with a disability limiting certain life functions.
374. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
375. For example, a deaf individual and a paraplegic will have physical differ-
ences that may need to be taken into consideration by a government enacting legis-
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These factors were discussed and discarded, however, as in-
capable of elevating the status of the disabled to that of a quasi-
suspect class, 376 despite the fact that the Court there purported
to be applying rational basis review, but instead engaged in
heightened scrutiny.377 The enactment of the ADA can be read
as congressional approval of the Cleburne dissent, with Con-
gress trying to force the Court to use more than mere rational
basis review, or to at least openly acknowledge that it had used
heightened scrutiny.378
Placing the disabled into the quasi-suspect class category
would be the best approach the Court could take when faced
with the issue of which level of review should be afforded to the
disabled. It would allow benign legislation, drawing legitimate
classifications predicated on real differences to remain,379 while
ridding society of the statutes that perpetuate outdated notions
of inequality.380 Quasi-suspect status would also be the best
compromise, especially given that the Court is reluctant to add
lation based on disability. Similarly, a severely mentally retarded individual may
be properly treated differently from a highly intelligent person disfigured by burns.
376. The Court in Cleburne declined to find the mentally retarded to be even a
quasi-suspect class. The Court made reference to the "'unfair and often grotesque
mistreatment'" of the mentally retarded, Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 438, 454 (Stevens,
J., concurring) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d 191,
197 (5th Cir. 1984)), as well as to their "immutable characteristics," id. at 472 n.24
(Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part), but yet
still declined to admit it was using heightened scrutiny.
377. See supra notes 270, 365 and accompanying text, explaining that the
Cleburne Court used a form of heightened scrutiny under the guise of rational ba-
sis review.
378. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 466-67 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan &
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
that evolving standards of equality come to be embodied in legislation and that
courts should view this as a sign of change, allowing it to influence their decisions).
379. See, e.g, Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 508; Kahn, 416 U.S. at 353-54 (both
upholding remedial legislation classifying based on gender).
380. The Supreme Court has invalidated a broad range of statutes that relied
on outdated notions of prejudice and inequality between the sexes. See, e.g, Kirch-
berg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (invalidating a statute granting only hus-
bands the right to manage and dispose jointly owned property without their wives'
consent); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (striking down a
statute that required a widower, but not a widow, to show he was incapacitated
from earning to recover benefits for a spouse's death under worker's compensation
laws); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (declaring unconstitutional a statute provid-
ing that only men could be ordered to pay alimony following a divorce); Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (annulling a statute allowing widows, but not
widowers, to collect survivors' benefits under the Social Security Act).
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to the already existing categories of suspect classifications.38 1
Quasi-suspect status would give effect to the congressional lan-
guage used in the ADA, where Congress states that the disabled
are a discrete and insular minority with a history of purposeful
unequal treatment.3 2 Courts are not bound by congressional
findings, but the weight of Congress' intentions nevertheless
can help change judicial opinion, 383 making such an interpreta-
tion that the disabled are entitled to heightened scrutiny more
likely. Allowing the courts and the legislature to work together
to further equal protection rights can only forge respect be-
tween two co-equal branches-the judiciary and the legislature.
F. Implications if the Supreme Court Were to Refuse to Grant
Special Status to the Disabled
The Supreme Court will eventually review the issue of
which level of scrutiny to apply to governmental action affecting
the disabled. If the Court refuses to hold that the disabled are a
suspect or quasi-suspect class, the decision would send a
message to the nation's courts that persons with disabilities
should not receive the same protections as those given to race
and gender, despite the ADA. However, the disabled would still
have the ADA, a major comprehensive statute designed to as-
sist them, which, given the chance to develop, would provide
much needed protection to persons with disabilities.38 4 Because
of its broad reach, the ADA has the potential to cover most ar-
eas of discrimination in our society, leaving few gaps where the
courts would need to use their own standards of review. 85 For
381. See O'Toole, supra note 268, at 734 (stating that since Cleburne, the
Court has not issued a single decision which expands traditional suspect
classifications).
382. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
383. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 466-67 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan &
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also
supra notes 309-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the Court
changed the scrutiny given to gender discrimination cases after Congress had leg-
islated to outlaw gender discrimination, thereby acknowledging congressional
intent.
384. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
disability in employment, public services, public accommodations, and telecommu-
nications to both the states and the private sector).
385. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213; see also supra notes 158-69 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the wide coverage of the ADA.
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the most part, courts will be engaging in statutory interpreta-
tion when faced with an ADA issue in the future and, thus, will
merely be applying the statute to the particular facts of a given
case.38 6 However, when faced with a non-ADA question, (such
as a general equal protection claim not falling within the spe-
cific provisions of the ADA), the courts will have to engage in
their own scrutiny,38 7 and only then will suspect class status, or
lack thereof, become a major issue.
V. Conclusion
The question of whether the disabled will be transformed
into a suspect or even a quasi-suspect class, now that Congress
has passed the ADA, is a perplexing one based on the split deci-
sions that have emerged on both sides. Although the courts
have not had many occasions to address this issue, a few courts
have already spoken. Based on these cases, it appears that the
courts which are refusing to hold that the disabled are a suspect
or quasi-suspect class are not specifically basing their reasoning
on the ADA, but rather are following the Supreme Court's lead
in Cleburne. There, the Court stated in dictum that it refused
to go down the path of granting the disabled suspect class sta-
tus for fear of having to give other classes the same status. 388
Cleburne was decided in 1985, five years prior to the ADA's pas-
sage and, therefore, does not definitively answer the question
posed.
Since the enactment of the ADA, the United States
Supreme Court has never ruled on this particular issue, deny-
ing certiorari in the only case that properly requested review,
Ibarra v. Duc Van Le.38 9 Because the Supreme Court has de-
386. See SINGER, supra note 29, § 45.01, at 1 ("When an authoritative written
text of the law has been adopted, the particular language of the text is always the
starting point on any question concerning the application of the law."); see also
supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of statutory
interpretation.
387. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-40 (stating that absent congressional di-
rection, the courts have devised their own standards for reviewing legislation
under the Equal Protection Clause-the three-tier approach of equal protection
review).
388. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446-47.
389. 114 S. Ct. 918 (1994); see also Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642 (1993)
(refusing to address the issue of whether the disabled constitute a quasi-suspect
class based on the failure to raise the issue in any of the lower courts).
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nied certiorari in Duc Van Le, the question remains unan-
swered. Each court, whether federal or state, is therefore free
to decide the issue as it sees fit. This can only cause further
confusion in the nation's courts as they try to harmonize pre-
ADA decisions, such as Cleburne, and the ADA itself, and come
to conclusions as to what type of judicial protection should be
given to persons with disabilities. At some point, the Supreme
Court will have to resolve the confusion and provide a definitive
answer to guide the lower courts.
When the Court finally does review the issue, if it grants
persons with disabilities a higher standard of review based on
Congress' language in the ADA describing the disabled as a
"discrete and insular minority," then Congress, with the help of
the Court, will have effectively expanded the rights of persons
with disabilities under the Equal Protection Clause within the
meaning of the Court's decisions. Quasi-suspect class status
would provide the best solution for persons with disabilities, be-
cause it would enable the courts to strike down discriminatory
legislation based on notions of inequality, while upholding be-
nign legislation based on real and meaningful differences be-
tween persons with disabilities and the general population.
Heightened scrutiny would give effect to the congressional in-
tent in passing the ADA-to provide clear, strong, and consis-
tent standards addressing discrimination against individuals
with disabilities-while allowing the Court, which may be re-
luctant to deem the disabled a suspect class, to grant some form
of special protection to the disabled beyond mere rational
review.
Whether or not the Supreme Court decides that Congress
has now mandated suspect or quasi-suspect class status to the
disabled, the fact remains that the ADA will provide the sup-
port of a major comprehensive statute. Ultimately, the decision
of whether the disabled will be raised to the level of suspect or
quasi-suspect class status will be left to the discretion of the
Supreme Court. Until then, persons with disabilities are at the
mercy of all lower courts. Hopefully, each new decision will pro-
vide some insight into the web of confusion that has resulted
from the various courts attempting to decide the issue, and re-
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veal what the future holds for people with disabilities in the
area of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.
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